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Summary
This report was created as part of a project dealing with the preconditions, strategies and
problems of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and addresses an important aspect of the
disarmament problem – verification.
A one-hundred percent successful verification will never be achieved, but it would be
wrong to conclude that a nuclear weapon free world is only acceptable in the casee of
perfect verification. The demands on verification depend to a large extent on mutual trust
between states and on previous experience of nuclear disarmament and its verification to
date. The requirements will, however, rise in the course of the disarmament process.
Particularly in the final phases, when the number of arsenals falls below a hundred,
verification will have to satisfy extremely high demands both in terms of quantity and
quality.
The nuclear disarmament of nuclear weapon states can be carried out in many individual
steps, the first of which are already taking place now or will be doing so in the near future.
These steps include, among other things, deactivation measures, further reductions,
dismantling of warheads, disposition of nuclear material from disarmed warheads and,
finally, the destruction or conversion of nuclear weapon-related facilities. Only very few of
these steps are already being verified today. Apart from declarations and transparency
measures, the internationally binding commitment not to rescind measures once they are
taken is an important factor. Verification would have to consist of a synergy of different
methods. These include: the identification of warheads with the aid of nuclear-physical
measurements, seals, all the IAEA safeguards used in the non-nuclear weapon states,
extensive rights of access for challenge inspections, the use of satellite surveillance,
National Technical Means, the disclosure of historical documents, the creation of
maximum transparency in former nuclear weapon states, and the possibility of enforcing
clarification of suspicions if necessary. The protection of proliferation relevant information
must be considered. Once a nuclear weapons complex is destroyed, any further possession
of nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely.
Even after comprehensive disarmament, the world will have to live with permanent
verification in order to detect any future attempts at secret rearmament in time. To this end,
a universal verification system will have to be established which is capable of early
detection of the different elements of a nuclear-weapon program. These include the
acquisition of either high enriched uranium or plutonium, the development of ignition
technology, the development of theoretical principles, the development of an
infrastructure, acquisition activities, and not least secrecy measures. Here, too, a synergy of
different verification measures will have to be implemented which should be based on the
further development of IAEA safeguards, including all reforms. Other important elements
of this synergy are the inclusion of all data, including those gathered by National Technical
Means and espionage, the extremely extensive rights of access for the verification agency,
the use of state-of-the-art equipment, including satellites, maximum transparency of all
relevant activities, the reconstruction of production histories with the aid of historical
documents, the impossibility of rejecting challenge inspections, the readiness of as many
states as possible to co-operate, and the protection of informants. The probability that the
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construction of several warheads will remain undetected despite a verification system of
this kind is very low.
There will always be a few states under suspicion which do not co-operate with the
verification authorities, but it is precisely their activities that must be detected by
verification. Historical cases of proliferation are South Africa, Iraq and North Korea. In all
three cases, the verification system fell short of the standard which would be necessary for
a nuclear weapon free world. The cases demonstrate that although it was possible to
establish a number of suspicious indications using the then insufficient verification,
important information was never revealed to the international community, for example,
that South Africa had built six warheads, or that Iraq had intensively developed
electromagnetic uranium enrichment. With the measures in place today, suspicions would
have been aroused much earlier. South Africa’s activities would not have remained
undetected with full-scope safeguards. In the case of North Korea, the measures of the
IAEA were already more intrusive and lead to the emergence of concrete suspicion. But
precise clarification of the North Korean activities is so far not possible, since there are no
means of enforcing the inspections against the will of the state. The surveillance of the
international transfer of technology plays an important role for the early detection of
suspicious acquisition activities. How far subsequent verification of whether a state has
totally disarmed is possible can be examined by studying the case of South Africa. There
are, however, limitations for the comparison between South Africa and the established
nuclear weapon states.
An important element of a future system must be the possibility of using any kind of
information and National Technical Means. A maximum level of transparency of all
nuclear activities in all states, which must far exceed present levels of transparency,
continues to be a prerequisite. This relates in particular to the nuclear activities of
disarming nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, it must be possible to implement the
measures flexibly. In the event of suspicion and a lack of co-operation, verification
activities must be reinforced, whereas in cases where trust has become firmly established
over a long period of time, it must be possible to reduce the level of activities.
The successful implementation of verification measures depends not least also on the
organisational structure of the verification system and must therefore be carefully
considered. Rapid decision-making structures and the ability of assertion are of great
importance. The decision-making body must be representative for the community of states.
The Security Council could only be considered for this after a comprehensive reform. All
technologies used should be internationalised as far as possible, e.g. the use of satellites,
which are currently employed almost exclusively as National Technical Means. In the long
term, individual verification organisations could be consolidated. The IAEA should
provide the starting point for the development of the final organisational form for
verification. The role of social verification must be reinforced. Even if the process of total
nuclear disarmament is initiated by a relatively small number of states, in the end, all states
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1 Introduction
In the debate on the feasibility of armament reductions, the goal of a nuclear weapon free
world has long been totally neglected. The last official proposals for total nuclear
disarmament, which were developed before the end of the Cold War, originated from the
1960s.1 The permanent failures in the attempt to find a method for the elimination of
nuclear weapons, the cementing of the bipolar structure of the Cold War and the
accompanying nuclear arms race caused the chances of success for efforts towards nuclear
disarmament to sink to zero. Given this situation, the concept of partial arms control
seemed vastly more promising. The goal of comprehensive nuclear disarmament was
abandoned, and instead, efforts were made to reach partial agreements which were to
increase international security. In this instance, arms control treaties were not necessarily
aimed at reducing or eliminating nuclear potentials, but could also involve armament
restrictions (in the sense of upper limits) or even controlled rearmament. The most
important aim was to guarantee the stability of the two superpowers’ fragile nuclear
deterrent system. On one hand, that meant reinforcing national controls of nuclear weapons
in order to exclude the possibility of an “unintended“ nuclear war. On the other hand, the
nuclear weapon arsenals had to be structured in such a way as to ensure that the deterrent
remained effective also in times of crisis, and that, consequently, a first strike would be
pointless.2 Arms control was little more than an amendment to the nuclear deterrent
doctrine. Nuclear disarmament was forced to take a back seat in the debate as a whole.
Today, a few years after the end of the East-West Conflict, the idea of a nuclear weapon
free world is gathering momentum. Moving forces behind the idea are primarily non-
governmental organisations. As part of a whole range of projects, they are currently
concerned with the terms and conditions for additional disarmament steps, the ultimate
goal being a nuclear weapon free world.3 At government level, especially in nuclear
weapon states and among their allies, the possibility of complete denuclearisation is still
met with scepticism, and also in part with rejection. However, the circle of advocates of
nuclear disarmament is increasingly widening. In 1995, the Australian government
established the Canberra Commission. This forum with international membership
comprehensively and systematically discussed the possibilities and problems of
                                         
1 Franz W. Seidler, Die Abrüstung. Eine Dokumentation der Abrüstungsbemühungen seit 1945,
München/Wien (Günter Olzog Verlag), 1974.
2 Harald Müller, Von der Feindschaft zur Sicherhe tspartnerschaft - Eine neue Konzeption der
Rüstungskontrolle, in: Berthold Meyer (ed.), Eine Welt im Chaos?, Frankfurt/M. (Edition Suhrkamp,
Friedensanalysen 25), 1996, pp. 399-426 und Uwe Nerlich (ed.): Strategie der Abrüstung, Gütersloh
(Bertelsmann), 1962; Erhard Forndran, Rüstungskontrolle. Friedenssicherung zwischen Abschreckung
und Abrüstung, Düsseldorf (Bertelsmann), 1970, esp. pp. 85-124.
3 In addition to the Hessischen Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, the Henry L. Stimson Center,
the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (Inesap) and the Verification and Technology
Centre (Vertic) work on issues of total nuclear disarmament. One of the first international studies with a
technical focus is: Federation of American Scientists in collaboration with the Committee of Soviet
Scientists for Global Security and the Center for Program Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
Ending the production of fissile materials for weapons, verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads
– The technical basis for action, Washington D.C., June 1991.
2comprehensive nuclear disamament.4 In December 1996, sixty-one former high-ranking
members of the military, from countries including Russia, France and the USA, advocated
an immediate, drastic reduction and eventual abolition of all nuclear weapons. In February
1998, this was followed by a declaration by over a hundred political leaders, heads of state
and former heads of state from all over the world, who supported the abolition of nuclear
weapons.5
This report was written as part of a project which is concerned with the prerequisites,
strategies and problems of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and is devoted to one
important aspect of the disarmament problem –  verification.
Verification, i.e., the controlling of compliance with obligations accepted by the parties to
an arms control agreement, is often an important prerequisite for the achievement of a
treaty. It becomes especially relevant in cases where the treaties affect weapon stockpiles
which are perceived as particularly threatening or which play an important role in the
deployment strategy of the military. Various proposals for total nuclear disarmament
forwarded by the USA and former USSR broke down on the verification issue, and even
today, no reduction in the nuclear potential of nuclear weapon states is even thinkable
without sufficiently reliable verification. Yet how well a verification system must work for
states to accept restrictions in their armament potential remains controversial. Depending
upon how high they set their requirements, a whole range of measures are available to
them which can be applied individually or collectively.
Verification in the arms control area is usually based on the verification of declarations
concerning  kind, number, and location of certain weapon systems. These inspections can
be carried out in a number of ways. When applying so-called National Technical Means
(NTM), verification is usually carried out without the active co-operation of the state under
inspection. Classic NTM are satellites, seismic sensors and radar systems, but they also
include the intelligence service activities and the collecting and processing of information
via government departments. 6 On-site inspections are more extensive than NTM since
they intervene more fundamentally in the sovereignty rights of states and presuppose a
readiness to co-operate. Routine inspections allow inspectors to carry out controls at
predefined times and at previously agreed locations on a state territory. Challenge
inspections are used to look into specific indications for non-compliance. They are more
intrusive than routine controls since the state under inspection would have problems
adapting to them, if it really did want to hide something. However, their execution is
always connected with certain conditions in order to prevent the uncontrolled collection of
data (i.e. espionage). The results of the data collection emanating from NTM and on-site
inspections must, in some cases, be analysed by laboratories before conclusions can be
drawn about compliance with treaty obligations. This, too, is a part of the verification.
                                         
4 See Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996.
5 Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 11 (December), 1996,p. 38 and no. 23 (February), 1998, p. 24.
6 Data is, of course, also collected by intelligence services. Here, we mean authorities which, due to the
nature of their activities, possess information which could be useful for the verification of a treaty, e.g.
an authority which licenses exports.
3After all, “whistle-blowing“ supplements the range of verification elements. A whistle-
blower is someone who passes on information regarding banned activities to the
appropriate recipient (a verification organisation, the media, and/or intelligence services
etc.). Whistle-blowers are often people who are employed on secret projects.
Thus, despite enormous variations in detail, verification systems consist of constantly
recurring elements:
· Declarations
· National Technical Means (NTM)
· Routine inspections
· Challenge inspections
· Technical data analysis / data processing
· “Whistle-blowing“
These elements are mostly employed in combination. However, there are also verification
agreements which are based solely on, for example, NTM.
In many cases, the verification of arms control and/or disarmament agreements encounters
the principle problem of non-military and military ambivalence. Many of the components
from which weapons are made are also used in non-military industries, and therefore
cannot simply be banned. In the case of these so called dual-use goods, verification is very
difficult since it is not their existence, but the way in which they are used that is crucial.
The verification of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear weapon free world is confronted by
precisely this problem. Nuclear fissile material and numerous other nuclear weapon
components have a variety of non-military applications, not least in the nuclear energy
industry.
In this report, we address the matter of whether a nuclear weapon free world is verifiable.
For this purpose we first of all work out which requirements must be set for the control of
the disarmament process and subsequently for the verification of an already denuclearised
world, and outline the methods which could be used to implement this verification. Both
these sections also have the task of providing the background knowledge necessary for
understanding the discussions which follow. Then we take three case examples – South
Africa, Iraq, and North Korea – to illustrate potential problems and limitations of the
verification methods which can arise in practice, and with which a future verification
system for nuclear disarmament must cope.
After this extensive outline of the problems, we take stock of the possibilities and
limitations of the applicable methods and the organisational variations for a nuclear
verification system. Finally, we can set the political requirements on and the practical
problems of nuclear disarmament into perspective with the technical and organisational
possibilities.
42 Trust and Control
2.1 Technical Limits and their Political Toleration
A good part of the verification of arms control treaties is only made feasible by the
deployment of state-of-the-art technology. The developments over the last decades in terms
of satellite surveillance, sensor technology, communication and data processing, today
provide a whole range of potential controls, which earlier seemed unattainable. The
existence of these state-of-the-art technologies improves the chances of reaching
agreements that were previously unacceptable due to the lack of technical verification
possibilities. However, we must be aware of the fact that technology has its limitations.
Even with the use of the finest means, there is still no one hundred percent certainty about
the compliance with arms control agreements, neither today nor in the foreseeable future.
There will always be a certain degree of uncertainty. However, this fact never was and
never will be a reason for a total abandonment of arms controls. Otherwise, agreements
such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), or the START treaties would never have
been achieved.7  The verification system should not be measured in terms of perfection; the
crucial factor is rather the guarantee of security for participating states. Not the perfecting
of verification methods was responsible for the achieving of these treaties, but an
interaction of improved technological means and  of the alteration of political conditions
which mark the end of the East-West Conflict.
One example worth mentioning is the CTBT, the negotiations for which were concluded in
1996. A whole range of varyingly lavish technological systems was available for its
verification. The negotiating forum did not choose the technically most sophisticated (and
most expensive) system, but opted for one which represented an acceptable compromise in
terms of various crucial criteria such as price, trust, effectiveness and control.8 They did
not touch upon its furthest technical limits. Instead, a certain amount of remaining
uncertainty regarding the fact that one of the contractual parties could cheat, was tolerated
by the negotiating delegations.
A further example is the verification of the NPT, which is implemented by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). One task is "the timely detection of
diversion of signficant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes
unknown".9 The terms "timely detection" and "significant quantity" are quantitatively
defined by the IAEA and form an adaptable measure for the compromise between trust and
                                         
7 Explanation of abbreviations in appendix.
8 A. Schaper, Der umfassende Teststoppvertrag: kurz vor dem Ziel - oder gescheitert?, Frankfurt/M.
(HSFK-Standpunkte no. 7), August 1996.
9 IAEA, INFCIRF/153 (corrected), para.28.
5control.10 Additional criteria, such as costs, for example, play a role here, too. During the
last IAEA safeguards reform, the discussion focused just on this relationship between trust
and control. The verification in states which might wish to cheat, for example Iraq, was
said to be insufficient, whereas the expenditure in trustworthy nations with non-military
nuclear industries, for example the number of inspections in Japan, Germany  or Canada
was said to be too high. The reform attempts to take this criticism into account and to apply
the measures in a more flexible way. At the same time, the technological possibilities were
extended, and the selective and quantitative reduction of expenditure was made possible.11
In this respect there is to be a transition from the previous system exclusively defined by
calculations to a more qualitative one.12
The question as to how good a verification system has to be is a recurrent theme in the
arms control and verification debate. Opponents of total nuclear disarmament argue that
the abolition or even only drastic reduction of nuclear weapons, if at all, must only take
place, if attempts at early detection of the secret acquisition of nuclear weapons can be one
hundred percent effective. Since this is not feasible in the foreseeable future, total nuclear
disarmament cannot be implemented. It would even pose a danger for those states that do
disarm and their allies.13 Advocates of a nuclear weapon free world instead pose the
question as to how high the level of uncertainty regarding contractual compliance may be
in order to still make allowance for the security needs of states.
Various attempts have been made to develop a generalisable formula for the definition of
requirements on verification. In the debate on total nuclear disarmament an approach from
the 1960’s is still recurring. The then scientific advisor to President Kennedy, Jerome
Wiesner, developed a model which required an inversely proportional ratio between the
number of weapon systems allowed and the frequency of inspections. In other words, with
the decreasing number of available weapons, the number of inspections ought to increase.
Wiesner’s model is based on the assumption that national security is to be measured in
terms of military defence capability. The intensity of inspections would depend on the
dangers posed by undiscovered violations.14 If the weapon stockpiles of a state were only
moderately reduced, i.e. if a relatively high amount of residual stocks remains in service,
then minor treaty violations would not result in any relevant military advantage for the
potential opponent. However, the further-reaching  the reductions, the greater is the
                                         
10 IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 1987 (Edition), Vienna, 1987. Some terms are explained in the appendix
(Glossary of Some Specialist Terms Used in the Verification System of the IAEA).
11 On the problem oftransition from rigid, quantitative regulations, to flexible, more subjective
regulations, which take account of suspicion, see A. Schaper, Implementing Safeguards in Countries of
Concern, in Erwin Häckel (ed.), in preparation.
12 The reform is, at present, in he early stages of implementation. For this reason, there is, as yet, no
practical experience which could be used for a critical evaluation.
13 C. Paul Robinson/Kathleen C. Bailey, To Zero or Not to Zero: A US Perspective on Nuclear
Disarmament, in: Security Dialogue, vol. 28, no. 2, 1997, pp. 149-158; Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems
Facing Total Nuclear Disarmament, in: Director’s Series on Proliferation, no. 5, 1994, pp. 71-86.
14 See Jerome B. Wiesner, Umfassende Systeme der Rüstungsbeschränkung, in: Uwe Nerlich (ed.),
Strategie der Abrüstung, Gütersloh (Bertelsmann), 1962, pp. 219-257, esp. p. 234.
6potential danger posed by small, undiscovered illegal stocks, and the higher are the
requirements on the verification system.
Wiesner’s approach is, in principle, still accepted today - we have merely deviated from his
purely quantitative orientation. On one hand, verification is no longer understood as merely
an expression of the frequency of inspections, but rather as a comprehensive control
system which can above all be measured in terms of qualitative standards. On the other
hand, it is no longer only the number of weapon systems which is considered, but also their
type and capability. The Wiesner model can thus be amended and/or modified as follows:
The greater the potential threat posed by the weapons systems subject to control measures,
the more important is the early detection of illegal stockpiles, and the higher are the
requirements on the capability of the verification system.
The more difficult it is to counter a military threat caused by illegal weapon systems, the
greater is the danger to national security, and the higher are the requirements on the
verification system.
The influence of Wiener’s model on the academic and political debate on arms control and
disarmament issues is unmistakable. The 1982 Palme Commission came to the conclusion
that “[the] more a treaty intervenes in existing arsenals [...], the more comprehensive the
means must be, which are defined in the agreement for its verification.“15 Du ng he
negotiations of the INF treaty, the chairman of the American Senate Intelligence
Committee doubted the verifiability of the agreement since “ the value of any Soviet
cheating would be far greater after substantial cuts in superpowers' arsenals“.16 Many of the
more recent efforts towards nuclear disarmament are based on this premise, too.17
2.2 The Relationship between Verification and National Security in the Case of Total
Nuclear Disarmament
If the two foregoing criteria are applied to the verification of total nuclear disarmament or
a nuclear weapon free world, we come at first glance to a sobering conclusion:
                                         
15 See Der Palme-Bericht. Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission für Abrüstung und Sicherheit, Berlin
(Severin und Siedler), 1982, p. 152.
16 Quoted in James A. Shear, Verification, Compliance and Arms Control: The Dynamics of Domestic
Debate, in: Lynn Eden/Steven E. Miller (eds.), Nuclear Arguments Ithaca/London (Cornell Univ. Press),
1989, p. 284.
17 The American project on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction of the American Stimson
Center and the work of the British Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC) can be given
as examples. An Evolving US Nuclear Posture, Second Report of the Steering Committee. Project on
Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report no. 19, December,
1995, p. 3; Patricia Lewis, Laying the Foundations. Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear
Weapons (VERTIC), July, 1998.
7In the early phases of the disarmament process18, i.e. as long as the number of nuclear
weapons is still in the hundreds, a relatively large number of warheads would have to be
produced secretly in order to achieve a substantial military advantage over other disarming
states. The requirements on a verification system would be lower at this point, since small
stockpiles of illegal weapons would not impair the security of other treaty member states,
and the acquisition of large quantities would be difficult to keep secret. At a more
advanced stage in the reduction of the nuclear arsenals, the efficiency of the verification
system would have to be constantly improved since the danger posed by each single
nuclear weapon presumably increases as the total number decreases.
The potential threat posed by nuclear weapons is generally estimated to be very high.
Warheads have an enormous destruction potential. Teamed with modern carrier systems,
they are also capable of reaching far-distant targets in a very short time. The long-term
damage caused by radioactive contamination raises the danger they pose and puts them
clearly above the threat posed by conventional weapons. The requirements on a
verification system are high according to this assessment
In the opinion of opponents of total nuclear disarmament, the only potentially effective
response to a nuclear threat, or to the deployment of nuclear weapons, is with nuclear
weapons.19 If the present nuclear weapon states disarmed to below a certain level, they
would no longer be in a position to deal adequately with a treaty violator, and could also no
longer protect their allies. Once they had totally disarmed their existing arsenals and the
infrastructure necessary for their construction, the time required to rearm would be
prolonged to such an extent that it would endanger their survival as states. If this argument
is adopted, then the following must apply here, too: the more advanced the disarmament of
nuclear weapons, the higher the demands on a verification system. From this point of view,
total abolition can provide security only with a perfectly functioning verification system.
The attraction of Wiesner’s model is fatal, not because his assumptions were
fundamentally wrong, but because they are applied without further reflection, thus leading
to the erroneous conclusion that a nuclear weapon free world is only acceptable subject to
perfect verification. This is due to the fact that even the modified version of Wiesner’s
model which is in use today fails to consider important aspects of the states’ risk
calculation.
The first error occurs in the defining of the threat posed by a certain weapon arsenal – a
political process which always contains a strong subjective element. In the course of this
                                         
18 We assume that a nuclear-weapon-free world cannot be achieved in  single step, but rather stands at the
end of a whole series of disarmament steps. This is mentioned here because there are also other opinions
on how and, above all, how fast nuclear disarmament should be carried out.
19 This assumption is wide spread. See z. B. William J. Perry, Desert Storm and Deterrence, in: Foreign
Affairs, vol. 70, no. 4, 1991, pp. 66-82. This has, however, been surpassed in view of the present
possibilities in the conventional area. Even if high demands are put on the defence capabilities, these can
be fulfilled by the conventional armed forces. A more detailed examination of the issue of conventional
defence / deterrence capabilities is to be found in Alexander Kelle, Security in a Nuclear-weapon-free
World – How to Cope with the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat, Frankfurt/M. (PRIF
Report no. 50), 1998; and Charles T. Allan, Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and
Out of the Nuclear Fire?, in: Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, 1994, pp. 203-233.
8process, a government will always include the relationship to the other states participating
in the agreement in their considerations. This means that the tenser the relationship, i.e. the
greater the mistrust between the negotiating parties, the lower the probability may be that a
treaty violation will remain undetected, and vice versa. According to Wiesner’s model, the
trust between the negotiating parties declines as the degree of disarmament advances since
the threat posed by each single weapon rises as the total number of weapons falls. This
conclusion is erroneous. Nuclear disarmament is a process during which the contracting
states gather experience  which they apply to their calculations. This experience also
covers the sequence and results of verification measures. If the outcome is positive on a
continuous basis, the trust in the participants of the disarmament process. Indications of a
positive verification outcome are, for example, a constant rise in the level of transparency,
no perceptible attempts to refuse data transfer or inspections, and no detection of non-
compliance.
The second error occurs in the evaluation of the potential reactions to a nuclear threat.
Conventional deterrents against nuclear weapons are now regarded a realistic option.20 If
this is the case, a state can abandon nuclear weapons without being provided with one-
hundred percent certainty by the verifications system. The issue of the feasibility or non-
feasibility of non-nuclear deterrents or defence cannot be dealt with in more detail here.21
In no way, however, does total nuclear disarmament lead to states being incapable of
defence.
Despite the criticism given here, the Wiesner model is of importance for the discussion of
the verification issue. The requirements that are made on verification will actually rise in
the course of the disarmament process. Particularly in the final phases, when arsenals
fluctuate to below one hundred, the verification procedure will have to satisfy extremely
high requirements, both in terms of quality and quantity. The reduction of nuclear weapons
to below the threshold regarded as essential for a minimum deterrent is not only a drastic
step in terms of military strategy, but it presupposes the surmounting of a psychological
barrier. Although nuclear weapons lose their importance as the fundamental component in
the deterrent system, the perception of the high potential threat posed by nuclear weapons
and the assessment of the feasibility of alternative defence methods play a n important role
in the analysis of the permissible “margin of tolerable non-verifiability“.22 However, it is
important to oppose the determinism which is derived from Wiesner’s model and which
degrades the idea of a nuclear weapon free world to an unrealistic utopia. Even in the last
phase of nuclear disarmament not a “perfect“ verification system is  needed, but one which
takes the security needs of states into account. The nature of these security needs does not
                                         
20 See e.g. Marc Dean Millot/Roger Molander/Peter A. Wilson, “The Day After...“, Study: Nuclear
Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World, vol. 1, Summary Report. Santa Monica, Calif. (Rand), 1993,
p. 19.
21 Op. cit. (fn 19).
22 Bettina Wieß, Verifikation und “compliance issues“. Die amerikanische Diskussion um strategische
Rüstungskontrolle (1977-1985) und der INF-Vertrag, Studien zur Friedensforschung, volume 1,
Münster/Hamburg (Lit), 1994, p. 6.
9only depend on the number of nuclear weapons still available, but also, to a substantial
degree, on the mutual awareness of the states involved and of their aims and motives.
3 Tasks and Methods of Verificat on in a Nuclear Weapon Free World
3.1 Disarmament and Verification of Former Nuclear Weapon States
A series of steps in the nuclear disarmament process could be implemented already before
the decision has to be made as to how far-reaching this process should be in end-effect:
whether it should really be heading towards zero, or whether it should stop at reductions
only. In the case of reductions, the requirements on verification are lower than in the case
of total nuclear disarmament, since it is only necessary to ensure that a certain number of
warheads has been destroyed. In the case of total nuclear disarmament, however, there is a
shift in tasks. On one hand, it must be verified that to a high degree of probability no more
hidden arsenals remain in existence – a rather different and more difficult task compared
with the verification of disarmament of declared warheads. On the other hand, in a nuclear
weapon free world, no special warhead factories and warhead material storage sites will
exist anymore, which would make nuclear rearmament technically more difficult and
increase detection probability of illegal activities.
A first move towards applying verification of nuclear reductions that can now realistically
be expected, could be implemented in a future START-III Treaty. In contrast to the
verification of START-I and START-II, which is limited to the destruction of carrier
systems and does not verify the disarmament of warheads, transparency and verification
measures for the destruction of nuclear warheads themselves would probably be
implemented in a START-III Treaty. This was already discussed at the Helsinki summit,
and is to be part of future START-III negotiations.23 A series of additional disarmament
measures also seems to be a realistic option for the near future; for example, other START
treaties, a treaty on the disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons, measures for extending
early-warning times or the verified disposition of weapon-grade nuclear material. 24
The transition to a nuclear weapon free world presupposes the successful implementation
of these interim steps and their verification. This would lead to the gaining of realistic
experience in the handling of technical and organisational verification procedures and
would strengthen the confidence of the contracting parties in one another and in these
procedures’ functional capability and reliability. This is an essential prerequisite for taking
                                         
23 President Clinton and President Yeltsin, Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear
Forces, White House Fact Sheet, Helsinki, 21. March 1997, printed in full in: Disarmament Diplomacy,
April 1997, p. 32. In concrete terms, a START – treaty should contain, among other things, "Measures
relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic
nuclear warheads … "
24 Harald Müller, Far-Reaching Nuclear Disarmament, Unidir Newsletter, no 31, 1995, p. 31; Lewis, op,
cit. (fn 17); Harald Müller/Annette Schaper, Vollständige nukleare Abrüstung – Wunschtraum oder
konkrete Möglichkeit?, in: Bruno Schoch/Friedhelm Solms/Reinhard Mutz (eds.), Friedensgutachten
1998, Münster (Lit),1998, p. 289.
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further steps. In addition to the verification implemented up to that point, the verification
of the transition will then require further, more intrusive measures which are based on and
developed from previous ones. This particularly includes verification of the absence of any
remaining hidden or “forgotten“ nuclear weapons – the reliability of which would rest on
the trust which had developed in the meantime. Following the completion of the
disarmament process, the majority of the verification procedures will become obsolete.
However, some will have to be applied continually in order to pursue the search for left-
over warheads as a deterrent on a random basis. This is explained in more detail in the
following sections.
The technical process of nuclear disarmament encompasses many individual measures.
Some of them are already being implemented as part of the INF Treaty and the START
treaties, namely deactivation measures, separation of warheads from the carriers,
destruction or conversion of the carrier systems and destruction of the silos.25 Some others
are taking place without any prior contractual stipulations, for example, the destruction of
warheads. Up to now, these have not been verified, but they could be integrated into future
disarmament treaties. One of the last steps would be the non-military disposition or further
use of the fissile material. Table 1 gives an overview of the most important nuclear
disarmament measures, their present obligation and transparency. In the first column
(measure), different stages of nuclear disarmament are listed. The second column
(implementation) indicates if and to what extent these measures are currently being
implemented. The third column (degree of obligation) indicates if, and in what form, an
obligation to carry out this measure already exists. The stronger this obligation, the more
difficult it is to reverse a measure. That is, the degree of irreversibility increases. Public
pressure already generates a little friction during the attempt to withdraw a measure and
therefore causes a certain element of irreversibility. In the case of valid international
treaties however, the obligation is stronger. The last column indicates whether the measure
is being verified, or whether at least a certain degree of transparency is being created. The
table provides insight into the present state of nuclear disarmament and possible future
measures. In the following sections of chapter 3, the methods for verification of these
measures are discussed.
3.1.1Initial Measures
The first and most urgent steps are deactivation measures for minimising the danger of an
accidental nuclear war (measures 1 – 17 of table 1). The necessity for such steps is not
disputed, but it is controversial how far they have already been successfully implemented.26
                                         
25 Anatoli p. Diakov (ed.), Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Process and Problems, Report des Center for
Arms Control Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology,
Dolgoprudny, October 1997.
26 In recent years, the number of warnings regarding the continued dangers of , e.g., on-going alert, faulty
controls and insufficient measures towards the reduction of these dangers has risen. See Alexej Arbatov,
Dealerting Nuclear Forces: A Substitute or Supplement to Disarmament?, in: Background Papers of the
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996, p. 303. Bruce G. Blair,
Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Brookings Occasional Papers, Washington D.C., 1995; see also
Lachlan Forrow/Bruce G. Blair/Ira Helfand/George Lewis/Theodore Postol/Victor Sidel/Barry p.
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Examples of these measures are deactivation, dealerting, detargeting, or the extension of
early-warning times. There are various different proposals as to which technical means can
be used to accomplish this. In addition to the START-II Treaty, foreign ministers Albright
and Primakov agreed to deactivate missiles intended for disarmament in advance.27 Some
technical measures are simple and could be easily verified, for example the extension of
early-warning times by piling earth onto the silos, which can be verified by means of
satellite pictures or on-site inspection. Others, such as detargeting, can easily be reversed
and their actual implementation is difficult to control.28 One measure which reliably
extends early- warning times is the separation of the warheads from the carriers and the
destruction of the carriers. This measure is already being implemented as part of the
START treaties 29 and is also being verified. The most important means in this context are
on-site inspections, the examination of certain carriers (bombers and missiles), surveillance
of the destruction of carriers and of the conversion of silos.
3.1.2Verification of Agreed Reductions
A prerequisite for disarmament is an overview of what is to be disarmed, that is,
inventories and registers of stockpiles (measurement no. 8 in table 1) 30. A nuc ar weapon
state which disarms a fixed number of warheads would issue declarations on this. The task
of verification is to control these declarations. An international nuclear weapons register is,
however, at present still rejected by nuclear weapon states.31 At a session of the NATO
Russian Council, the allies presented Russia with an inventory of nuclear weapons
deployed in Europe with a request for reciprocity. To date, the Russian side has not got
beyond statements of intention. An urgent problem is posed, above all, by tactical nuclear
weapons, whose numbers and application scenarios are unknown. They have not yet been
taken into account in any arms control agreement, and pose an increasing threat to
                                                                                                                     
Levy/Herbert Abrams/Christine Cassel, Accidental Nuclear War – A Post-Cold War Assessment, The
New England Journal of Medicine, April 30, 1998, Vo.l. 338, no. 18.
27 Letters from the foreign ministers Primakov and Albright "On Early Deactivation", 26.9.1997, in the
Internet at http://www.acda.gov/factshee/wmd/nuclear/start2/albrtltr.htm and http://www.acda.gov/
factshee/wmd/nuclear/start2/primakov.htm.
28 The current problems of deactivation and proposals for measures and their verification are given in
detail by Blair, op.cit. (fn 26).
29 Matthias Dembinski, Mit START zum Ziel der allgemeinen und vollständigen Abrüstun ? Stand und
Perspektiven der Bemühungen um "kooperative Denuklearisierung", Frankfurt (HSFK-Report no.3) ’93.
30 A review of all deployed nuclear weapons has been compiled by an NGO with the aid of publicly
accessible sources: William M. Arkin/Robert P. Norris/Joshua Handler, Taking Stock – Worldwide
Nuclear Deployments 1998, NRDC Nuclear Program, Washington, D.C., March 1998.
31 Harald Müller, The Nuclear Weapons Register – A Good Idea Whose Time Has Come, PRIF Reports
no. 51, June 1998. In its "Strategic Defence Review" of July 1998 the British Government has given
remarkably precise information on the number of warheads: Strategic Defence Review, Presented to
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, July 1998, in the Internet
at: http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm (August 1998). The proposal of a nuclear weapons register
is, however, also rejected by the new British Government.
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security.32 Verification is simpler in the case of quantitatively agreed reductions. It is then
merely a question of controlling that the declared warheads are not decoys.
Until completion of the destruction process, it must be ensured that declared warheads
cannot be exchanged for decoys. This includes monitoring during various transports,
Table 1: Nuclear Disarmament Measures and their Present Obligation and Transparency




1. inventories and registers of
stockpiles
unknown none, but is demanded none
2. reduction of the alert partially, success
disputed
none, but public pressure existsnone
3. detargeting partially, success
disputed
none, but public pressure existsnone
4. extension of early-warning




none, but public pressure existsNone
5. deactivation measures partially, success
disputed
Letters by foreign ministers
Primakov and Albright "On
Early Deactivation", 26.9.1997
None
6. separation of warheads from
carriers
takes place START treaties START treaties provide
verification
7. destruction or conversion of
carriers
takes place START treaties START treaties provide
verification
8. identification of warheads
(measurements, seals ..)
unknown None None















none, but public pressure and
international co-operation
projects exist
one, but some informa-
tion from international co-
operation is known
11. destruction of the ignitio
mechanism
takes place none None
12. separation of the primary from
the secondary parts
takes place none None
13. separation of the fissile mate-
rial (in the form of a so-called
"pit") from the other parts
takes place none, but this will be required




storage of the compnents planned,
international
technical aid
none, but this will be required
by the planned international
joint operation
possible controls to see if a
storage site built with
international financing is
used according to its
intended purpose




16. mechanical destruction of the
pit (cutting up and dissolving
…)
takes place only to
a very small extent
(experiments)
none none
17. none, but this will be required cf.14, 10 tons of U.S.-
                                         
32 Nikolai Sokov, Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Stop for Arms Control; The
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no.2, 1997
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storage of the fissile material as Pits (cf.13) by the planned international co-
operation (cf.14)
material under voluntary
IAEA safeguards, more is
expected and demanded
18. Non-military utilisation  or




none, but this will be required





19. shut-down and destruction or




a Cut-off  would prevent the use
of Pu and HEU to produce
explosives
a Cut-off  would imply a
corresponding verification,
otherwise none
particularly from the place of deployment to an intermediate storage site, and from there to
the factory in which they are to be dismantled. It is probable that some of the measures
necessary for this are already scheduled for inclusion in a future START-III Treaty. The
main difficulty when identifying declared warheads lies in the fact that sensitive
information must not be allowed to transpire, for example the construction principles of a
warhead (cf. section 5.1.2 Secrecy versus Transparency).
Verification methods are of a technical nature. Since this concerns a step the
implementation of which seems realistic in the near future, there are already a great
number of studies which deal with the subject of methods concretely.33 Some alr ady focus
in great detail on the technical realisation, i. e., on the construction of a technical
application.34
In this instance, it is assumed that a warhead is located in a sealed container.35 Since a
warhead contains radioactive material, it emits radioactive radiation. The type of radiation
that penetrates to the outside depends on the radiation and absorption characteristics of the
materials used, the additional shields and their geometric distribution, i.e., on the type of
explosive. In the simplest case, this radiation can be measured despite the shield (so-called
“passive detection“). In certain cases, this is not sufficient, and nuclear reactions which can
                                         
33 Examples include: S. Fetter, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament, The Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional
Papier no. 29, October 1996; a collection of various technical contributions in: F. v. Hippel/R. Z.
Sagdeev, Reversing the Arms Race — How to Achieve and Verify Deep Reductions in the Nuclear
Arsenals, New York 1990; earlier versions of these contributions are to be found in Science and Global
Security, Bd. I (1989-90); Christopher E. Paine/Thomas B. Cochran/Robert p. Norris, Techniques and
Procedures for Verifying Nuclear Weapons Elimination, Background Papers of the Canberra
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996, p. 167, Natural Recources Defense
Council, Report on the Third International Workshop on Verified Storage and Destruction of Nuclear
Warheads, Moscow and Kiev, December 16-20, 1991; Federation of American Scientists and Natural
Recources Defense Council, Report on the Fourth International Workshop on Verified Storage and
Destruction of Nuclear Warheads, Washington D.C, February 26-27, 1992. Sutcliffe, W.G., Warheads
and Fissile Materials: Declarations and Counting, Report UCRL-JC-108073, CTS-27-91, Livermore,
August 5, 1991; Chinese examples are contained in the volume of the Institute of Applied Physics and
Computational Mathematics, Program for  Science and National Security Studies (Arms Control
Collected Works), Beijing 1995.
34 W. Rosenstock/J. Schulze/A. Tüchsen/T. Köble/G. Kruzinski/G. Jaunich/J. Peter, M. Diedrichs,
Entwicklung und Untersuchung von transportablen Meßsystemen zur Verifikation von Kernwaffen,
INT-Bericht no. 162, Euskirchen, December 1995; W. Rosenstock/A. Tüchsen/T. Köble/G. Krzinski/M.
Jeske/A. Herzig/J. Peter, Aufbau einer transportablen Detektoranordnung zur Verifikation von A-
Waffen, INT-Bericht no. 169, Euskirchen, April 1997.
35 Source of the following: Steve Fetter/Valery A. Frolov/Marvin Miller/Robert Mozley/Oleg F.
Prilutsky/Stanislav N. Rodionov/Roald Z. Sagdeev, Detecting Nuclear Warheads, in: v.
Hippel/Sagdeev, op. cit. (fn 33), p. 265.
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be measured from the outside must be induced by “active“ measures such as neutron
bombardment. X-raying is also regarded as one of the active detection measures. The
radiation penetrating to the outside is characteristic of a certain type of warhead. A
measured spectrum is thus also known as a so-called “fingerprint“. Fingerprints of all types
of warheads can be recorded once and can then serve as a comparison for additional
measurements. In this way, it would not only be possible to distinguish real warheads from
fake ones, also the type could be identified without revealing proliferation-relevant
features. On 5th July 1989, a joint Russian – American experiment, the so-called “Black
Sea Experiment“, was carried out to detect a cruise missile warhead by using such passive
methods.36
However, the objection is risen, namely by a number of Chinese experts on close terms
with their government, that experts were still able to gather too much information from
such a spectrum.37 The authors refer directly to the results of the Black Sea Experiment.
With the aid of the spectrum measured there, they succeeded in drawing some conclusions
on the construction of the Soviet warhead which had escaped those involved in the
experiment. Although this data is not proliferation-relevant, the authors consider it too
transparent. In this instance, a principle political problem of the verification of nuclear
disarmament becomes obvious: the tradition practised in all nuclear weapon states of
keeping data relating to nuclear weapons secret, even if its publication would pose no
danger of proliferation or threat to their own security. This political problem is revealed by
technical secry regulations and is explained in more detail in section 5.1.2 (Secrecy
Versus Transparency). The Chinese authors themselves offer a technical solution to this
problem. They are of the opinion that the identification of warheads would also be possible
if a major part of the spectrum was hidden and only a small part revealed. A further
possibility would be to largely automate the process with the aid of “sealed“ computer
programs. First a fingerprint would be taken for reference. This is fed into a computer and
then does not need any further monitoring by inspectors, provided the software and
"barring" measures ensure that the program cannot be manipulated. Later, it can
automatically be established whether a warhead is of the same type.38
3.1.3Discovery of Undeclared Warheads
The task of verifying the destruction of warheads is more difficult if all are to be recorded.
In this case, it would not only be necessary to check whether declared warheads are real, as
                                         
36 Steve Fetter/Thomas B. Cochran/Lee Grodzins/Harvey L. Lynch/Martin S. Zucker, Measurements of
Gamma Rays from a Soviet Cruise Missile, in: v. Hippel/Sagdeev; op. cit. (fn 33); p. 379; S. T.
Belyaev/V. I. Lebedev/B. A. Obinyakov/M. V. Zemlyakov/V. A. Ryazantsev/V. M. Armashov/S. A.
Voshchinin, The Use of Helicopter-borne Neutron Detectors to Detect Nuclear Warheads in the USSR-
US Black Sea Experiment, ebd. p. 399.
37 Tian Dongfeng/Xie Dong/Liu Gongliang, High Energy Gamma-Ray "Fingerprint" – A Feasible
Approach to Verify Nuclear Warhead, in: Institute of Applied Physics … ; op. cit. (fn 33), p. 63.
38 Software for the authentication and coding is far developed. One example is PGP ("Pretty Good
Privacy").
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described in the previous section, but it would also have to be ensured that the declarations
are complete, i.e. that no additional, undeclared warheads remain in existence.
There are two reasons why, in violation of a disarmament treaty under international law, it
would be at all possible for warheads to remain in existence after complete disarmament.
The first reason is simply that they had been forgotten and is accounted for in terms of
slipshod book-keeping and chaotic division of responsibilities. In this case, the state
concerned would itself initiate the subsequent verified disarmament.39 The oth r possible
reason is that a nuclear weapon state had planned to cheat right from the start. In this
instance, it is safe to assume, however, that in a political arena in which the complete
abolition of nuclear weapons had been seriously contemplated, the intention to cheat would
be relatively improbable, and mutual trust would already be very high. Nevertheless, this
possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. The more precisely the inventories of existing
warheads were previously made, declared and made transparent to the international
community, the more difficult it will be for a nuclear weapon state then to develop defraud
strategies in which a specific number of warheads or warhead components remains
undetected.
In case there is any suspicion of the fact that undeclared "leftover" warheads can be found
at a certain location, this can be clarified by means of measurements and on-site
investigations. The methods are the same as described in the previous section. Hiding
places can be detected at short distances using technical means. However, these are
restricted to a few metres. In order to fully exploit this possibility, it must be possible for
challenge inspections to take place, which must not be allowed to be rejected.
There is, however, no guarantee that suspicions will actually arise. There are no technical
methods available for tracking down nuclear weapons if the location to be searched is not
known with some degree of accuracy. Suspicion is aroused as a result of documents found,
circumstantial evidence, informers, and the activities of the secret service. To maintain a
high probability of the emergence of suspicions, it must be allowed to use all data for
triggering a challenge inspection, especially those from unnamed sources, from the
verification results of other treaties, and from NTM.40 Maximum transparency on all past
activities is also crucial. The greater the degree of transparency and the further-reaching
the right of access for inspections, the stronger the growth of international confidence in
the honesty of all declarations. Frauds will be deterred by a sufficiently high probability of
detection.
Over and above the inclusion of suspicious indications, it would also be desirable to
control the declarations in order to ensure they are complete, since there remains the slight
uncertainty that they may have been submitted with a fraudulent intention. The greater the
mutual trust, the less this assumption is made (cf. section 2.2 The Relationship between
Verification and National Security in the Case of Total Nuclear Disarmament).This
inspection would require a reconstruction of the production history of the warheads. The
                                         
39 A disarmament treaty would require a face-saving procedure for this eventuality .
40 NTM is, in the meantime, a recognised element in almost all arms control treaties. The S3 reform also
implemented the possibility of using all kinds of information as trigger for challenge inspections.
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more transparency regarding production history has been previously achieved, the more
credible declarations are, too. A verification of the completeness of a nuclear weapons
register would only, if at all, be possible with the aid of historical documents. This would
be a costly and time-consuming undertaking since not only production, but also "loss
rates", for example, due to the destruction of warheads, utilisation in nuclear tests and other
experiments, or due to the sinking of submarines would have to be included.41 Full
transparency regarding the history of every single warhead and every production plant in
all nuclear weapon states would be a prerequisite for this. A great deal of sensitive
information, for example, the amount of plutonium used in a certain warhead type, would
have to be rvealed to the verification authority or the partners. Even then, uncertainty
would remain regarding the completeness of the documents. In addition, it is probably
impossible to reconstruct and calculate an initial inventory of all plutonium and uranium,
without significant discrepancies, since the production histories are simply too extensive
and complex (see section 3.1.5 Disposition of Nuclear Material).
Despite these difficulties, the attempt should be made. In this way, a process will be
implemented, which will constantly raise the level of transparency, and which contributes
to the creating and clarifying of suspicious indications. It is a prerequisite that trust must
then be so great that a few inaccuracies and discrepancies can be tolerated provided that, at
the same time, a co-operative effort is made to achieve transparency and clarity.
3.1.4Dismantling of Warheads
A nuclear warhead consists of various different components (for a more detailed
explanation, see Appendix: Functioning of Nuclear Weapons). An indispensable part is the
fissile material, either plutonium or high enriched uranium (HEU). In state-of-the-art
warheads, it appears in the shape of a hollow sphere known as the “pit“.42 This is part of a
warhead whose effects are based on nuclear fission, the so-called “primary“. In addition to
the pit, the primary also contains conventional explosives, an electronic ignition device, a
pipe for inserting tritium-deuterium gas and a neutron generator. All warheads now
deployed in the arsenals of nuclear weapon states are so-called “Hydrogen bombs (H-
bombs)“ which, apart from nuclear fission, also rely on nuclear fusion. In addition to the
primary, they also contain a so-called “secondary“, which consists of fusion material.
Primary and secondary are contained in a casing of heavy metal, e.g., uranium.
During the dismantling process, primary and secondary are first of all separated from each
other. The electrical ignition mechanism, the casing and the secondary can then be
dismantled into their separate components. These can be stored, destroyed, or used for non-
military purposes. The primary is dismantled in an additional step. The conventional
explosives and electronic parts can also be stored or be disposed of. The pit is the most
                                         
41 Fetter, op. cit. (fn 33).
42 The mass of the pit varies from warhead to warhead and is secret. Estimated averages and working
figures in studies lie at a few kilograms. The warhead selected for the South African nuclear weapons
program (gun assembly principle) was an exception. It is to be assumed that all existing warheads are
based on the implosion principle, including those of India, Pakistan and Israel.
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complex component in terms of production. If this part is destroyed, for example sawn
apart or chemically dissolved, the disarmament process has achieved a certain degree of
irreversibility. Pits from warheads destroyed by the USA and Russia have so far been
stored intact. In September 1998 however, the demonstration of the destruction of pits and
the conversion of nuclear material is to start in Los Alamos. Following this demonstration
phase, which, it is estimated, will run for approx. three years, the construction of a
dismantlement factory is due to start.43 The process will consist of nine steps, including the
separation of various different impurities in plutonium.44 In Russia (Mayak), a storage site
for nuclear weapon components is to be built with western aid. In Russia, the destruction
of pits has not yet begun, predominantly because Russia values reciprocity. 45
At present, there is no verification of the destruction of warheads. The necessity for the
introduction of verification and transparency measures is not only seen by observers; it is
also at least discussed by decision-makers in the USA and in Russia, as is made clear by
the joint statement issued at the Helsinki summit. Bilateral technological co-operation on
the subject of verification of the destruction of nuclear warheads has been taking place
since 1996, and the results were also used during the Helsinki consultations.46 The results
of this technological collaboration have not yet been published.47
The task of verification is to ensure that real warheads are destroyed and not decoys. For
this purpose, it is not absolutely necessary to verify the many intermediate steps (measures
11 – 16 in table 1). Instead, it must be guaranteed that warheads which have been identified
are delivered to the dismantlement factory in sealed containers, and that no warheads can
be removed intact from this factory.48 The exit must also be checked. If all non-nuclear
components have been destroyed as far as possible, the original parts no longer divulge any
sensitive information. Additional measures could consist of measurements of the
                                         
43 Nuclear Fuel, LANL wins Pu pit demonstration; Pnatex, SRS fight for big project, vol. 23, no. 17,
August 1998, p. 24.
44 Galium is included to stabilise the crystal structure of metallic plutonium.
45 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, Letter Report, 09/27/96, GAO/NSIAD-96-222.
46 The partners in this co-operation are the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and the Russian Federal
Nuclear Center – All Russian Research Institute of Technical Physics (RFNC–VNIITF). The latter is a
research laboratory in Snezhinsk (previously known as Chelyabinsk-70). This research institution was,
until now, responsible for research and development on new nuclear weapons. See N.F. Rubanenko,
Nuclear Weapons Transparent Dismantlement, Paper presented at the International Pugwash Workshop,
September 11-13, 1997, Snezhinsk, Russia.
47 There is a conference volume with approx. 50 technological contributions from a conference of both
research institutions from August 18-22, 1997. To date this has, however, only been made available to
the American and Russian governments.
48 There are various, partly very cheap methods of sealing. Many are being applied and further developed
by the IAEA and Euratom. One example is a forgery-safe method according to which characteristic
optical samples are created by means of fibre optic bundles: IAEA, Safeguards Techniques and
Equipment, International Nuclear Verification Series no. 1, Vienna 1995; see also Japanese Atomic
Energy Research Institute (JAERI), Research on Safeguards Technology, http://inisjp.tokai.jaeri.go.jp/
ACT95E/12/12-1.HTM; Zheng Yu Tian/Shi Hong Ju/Gongh Xia Bi/Deng Jun; The Study of Fiber-
Optic Seal Technology for Arms Control; Paper for the 8th International Summer Symposium on
Science and World Affairs, Beijing, July 23-31, 1996.
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composition of the emissions. That way it would be controlled  whether, for example,
components of conventional explosives have been burned. If the pit is still intact, it could
be transported in a sealed container to a high-security storage site. This can be verified in
the same way as the identity and transportation of entire warheads – a realistic scenario in
terms of a transitional solution. If also the pit is destroyed in this factory, which is the long-
term plan, the amount of "loose material", i.e. uranium and plutonium must be recorded at
the exist. As long as strict monitoring ensures it can be controlled that no pit and no loose
material is misappropriated, it is not even necessary to know the amount of material
contained in a specific warhead. An average figure would, however, be helpful. If this
amount and its composition can be divulged, the chemical dissolution of a single pit can
also be verified without knowing the exact geometrical construction. For this purpose, the
procedure is performed in a sealed container. It is verified that a pit is inserted, and the out-
flowing Pu or uranium solution is recorded.
If intact pits are to be stored initially, there is a simple and verifiable method of preventing
their reuse:49 Each pit has a hollow space and a narrow opening for inserting the tritium –
deuterium mixture necessary for boosting. A bent wire could be stuffed through this
opening in a way which cannot be reversed, and which prevents compression of the pit.
With the aid of the methods described above, e.g. gamma-spectroscopy, the presence of
such a wire can be verified. This would modify the fingerprint, but the possibility of
automation and protection of sensitive information remained unaffected.
These methods can be used to verify that a specific number of warheads has been
destroyed, but not whether all were recorded. The probability of the detection of
undeclared warheads must therefore be kept high (section 3.1.3).
In a nuclear weapon free world, this process must have been brought to a conclusion. The
final step is therefore the deconstruction of all plants, including dismantlement factories
and intermediate storage sites. Here, too, proliferation-relevant information could still be
revealed, for example due to the type of tools used. Their owner must therefore destroy
them past recognition inside the plant, and then open the former plant for international
inspection.
3.1.5Disposition of Nuclear Material from Disarmed Nuclear Weapons
Many schemes and studies already exist on the disposition of the loose material, i.e.,
technical procedures which lead to other non-military uses or final storage. This is because
large amounts of surplus material are already accruing as part of the START process. The
most advanced schemes plan to dilute the HEU to weapon-grade low enriched uranium and
to use it as reactor fuel. These schemes also plan to process and use plutonium either as
reactor fuel, the so-called "mixed oxide" fuel (MOX), or to mix it with radioactive waste,
                                         
49 Matthew Bunn, 'Pit-Stuffing': How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their
Dismantlement, Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, vol. 51, no. 2, March/April
1998, pp. 3-5.
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which would then be vitrified and put into final disposal.50 However, none of these plans
has, as yet, been implemented, and the estimated periods required stretch over many
decades.
The material will, in any case, be put into intermediate storage beforehand, and the task of
verification will be to ensure that it is not re-used for military purposes. The amount of
plutonium used for nuclear weapons is estimated at over 200 tons, and the amount of
nuclear-weapon HEU at over 1700 tons.51 The technical methods for this kind of
verification have been tested and improved by IAEA and Euratom safeguards for
decades.52 However, only a few tons of American material have so far been placed under
IAEA safeguards. The USA and Russia have the intention, however, to increase this
amount, although the concretisation of these plans is making only slow process. There are
several reasons – technical and political –for the delays. One reason is the technical effort
necessary for freeing this material from sensitive information (cf. section 5.1.2 Secrecy
versus Transparency).
The negotiations between the USA, Russia and the IAEA to subject disarmament fissile
material to IAEA verification measures ought to be evaluated as progress.53 Although thre
has as yet been no consensus on the introduction of international safeguards, an
unequivocal trend towards internationalisation of the control of and security for nuclear
material also inside nuclear weapon states can be observed.54 Declarations of intent or
pledges in terms of individual measures can be found, for example, in a statement issued at
the G8 summit in Moscow 199655, in various international co-operation projects with
                                         
50 Influential studies on the disposition of weapons plutonium have been carried out by, e.g., the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences: National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Committee on International
Security and Arms Control (CISAC), Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,
Washington 1994; NAS, CISAC, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor
Related Options, Washington 1995. A German – French – Russian project for the building of a MOX
pilot plant for Russian disarmament plutonium and an American – Russian agreement on the non-
military use of Russian disarmament uranium are among the most advanced plans. See Gesellschaft für
Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft und Ministerium für
Atomenergie der Russischen Föderation (MINATOM): Basisauslegung für eine Pilotanlage zur
Produktion von Uran-Plutonium-Brennstoff aus waffengrädigem Plutonium und zum Einsatz dieses
Brennstoffs in Kernreaktoren, Abschlußbericht, 28.02.1997; R. A. Falkenrath, The U.S.-Russian HEU
Purchase Agreement: Achievements, Problems, Prospects; Report of the Center for Science &
International Affairs, Harvard University, July 1995. Details of further projects can be found in: A.
Schaper, A Treaty on the Cut-off of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons – What to Cover? How to
Verify?, Frankfurt/M. (PRIF Reports no. 48), July 1997, chapter 2.4.1.
51 David Albright/Frans Berkhout/William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 –
World Inventories, Capabilites and Policies, SIPRI (Oxford University Press), 1997.
52 Tom Shea, On the Application of IAEA Safeguards to Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium from
Military Inventories, Science & Global Security, vol. 3, 1993, p. 223.
53 Department of Energy, Press Statement: Trilateral Initiative on Verifying Excess Weapon Origin Fissile
Materials, November 8, 1996; B. Pellaud, International Verification of US and Russian Materials
Released for Storage and Disposition, Paper presented at the International Policy Forum: Management
& Disposition of Nuclear Weapons Materials, Landsdowne, Virginia, 12 February 1997.
54 A. Schaper, The Case for Universal Full Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Material, The Nonproliferation
Review, vol. 5, no . 2, Winter 1998, p. 69.
55 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, April 20, 1996.
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Russia, in the implementation of the 1997 IAEA safeguards reform known as
"Strengthened Safeguards System" (S3),56 or in the guidelines on the handling of
plutonium, which were agreed between the most important plutonium-using states in
199757. In a 1993 transparency initiative, the USA started to publish data on its plutonium
stockpiles. However, the point at which international controls are to be employed has not
yet been determined and depends on the readiness of the governments concerned. In 1998,
also the British government published data on its stockpiles of nuclear material, and
expressed the intention of making its disarmament plutonium accessible for IAEA
inspections.58 Nevertheless, the British government wishes to retain its surplus HEU for its
submarines.
An important strengthening of this trend will result from the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty (FMCT), the decision for the negotiations thereof having been taken during the
Geneva disarmament conference in August 1998.59 It is not clear whether this treaty will
also take into account material produced before the treaty came into force, or how
extensive the verification measures will be. What is certain, however, is that this treaty will
put an end to the idea that the control of nuclear material and plants is solely the concern of
nuclear weapons states. In the meantime, the FMCT is increasingly regarded as an
“instrument of a process which is developing into a comprehensive regime for the
international control of nuclear material“.60 The universalisation of full scope safeguards,
even if not connected with comprehensive nuclear disarmament, is increasingly regarded
by the German government, among others, as an aim worth striving for.61
During the disarmament phase, it would be unrealistic to suppose that transitional rules and
regulations could be avoided. Thus, the technical and legal precondition for the
                                         
56 Determined in model protocol INFCIRC/540. The obligations of some nuclear weapons states were
expressed in: French declaration: Measures that France Intends to Apply for the Implementation of the
93+2 Programme, 13 May 1997 (unofficial English translation from French); British declaration:
Implementation in the UK of Measures Provided for in the Programme 93+2 Model Protocol, 13 May
1997. The elements of the reform are described in detail in: Suzanna van Moyland, Verification Matters:
The IAEA’s Programme ‘93+2’, Report VERTIC, January 1997. For the state of the implementation,
see: Suzanna van Moyland, Progress on Protocols: The IAEA's Strengthened Safeguards System,
Disarmament Diplomacy, June 1998, p. 9.
57 Guideline on the handling of plutonium , translated by AA, 2. February 1998.
58 Strategic Defence Review, op. cit. (fn 31).
59 In August there were advances in the CD towards the realisation of a negotiations forum which lead to
the setting up of an ad hoc committee for the negotiation of an FMCT: Rebecca Johnson, Geneva
Update, The CD: 1998 Round-up, Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 29, August/September 1998, p. 16.
60 This was so expressed, for example, in a paper presented to the Geneva disarmament talks on 29. April
1998 by the Australian government: Australia, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, Concept Paper, 29 April
1998. For possible variations on the scope of this ban and its verification, see Schaper, op. cit. (fn 50).
61 Foreign Office, Bericht zur Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung 1996, p. 56; see also
Jörg H. Gösele/Hans Herman Remagen/Gotthard Stein, "A German view on safeguards beyond 1995,"
in: Proceedings of the Symposium on International Nuclear Safeguards, vol. II (Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, March 14-18, 1994), p. 701, Hartmut Blankenstein, "Political Considerations
on the Future of Safeguards," Proceedings of the 17th Annual Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear
Material Management, (Aachen, Germany, 9-11 May 1995), p. 21.
21
introduction of international safeguards must first be created.62 This task is on the agenda
anyway, especially if an FMCT were to be successfully negotiated. An important problem
is the protection of proliferation-relevant information, which must be taken into account as
long as the disarmament process is not fully completed. This task is complicated by the –
partly exaggerated – secrecy in nuclear weapon states. It can be assumed, however, that a
rethink on this issue of secrecy will coincide with the loss of status associated with the
possession of nuclear weapons,  if the determination grows to achieve extensive or
comprehensive nuclear disarmament (see section 5.1.2. Secrecy versus Transparency).
3.1.6Discovery of Undeclared Materials
In the case of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, verification will have to go well
beyond all these approaches. Possession and production of nuclear material outside
international controls will have to be made illegal. The verification must be able to detect,
with sufficiently high probability, illegal misappropriation of this material and to track
down and identify any undeclared material that may be in existence. This is also verified in
the non- nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. The task in former nuclear weapon states
is, however, more difficult because of the long and complicated production history and the
decades of absence of any international controls.
An important method is the reconstruction of past production. A prerequisite for this is
maximum transparency in the production history of military material. The task of
verification then consists of controlling and re-recording measurement data with the aid of
the documentation, in order to establish an inventory in book form, which can then be
compared with the declarations. This was also applied in South Africa (section 4.1.4).
Furthermore, it is possible to draw conclusions regarding past by using radiological
measurements in  nuclear plants which have either been shut down or are still in
operation.63
There will, however, be a higher rate of errors during the determination of the initial stock
than in anything previously experienced by the IAEA. For example, in the data on
plutonium stockpiles published by the USA, there was indication of a discrepancy between
the measured stockpiles and the stockpiles calculated from the documentation, which
amounted to 2.7 tons – sufficient for approx. 1000 warheads.64 This does not mean that this
amount has been put aside; the discrepancy can be explained in terms of insufficient
documentation and inaccurate measurements in former times. Errors in future figures
emanating from some other NWS are likely to be even higher. In the former Soviet Union,
for example, material accounting was based solely on documentation but not on
                                         
62 Details of these tasks are described in Schaper, op. cit. (fn 50), chapter 4.5.4.
63 Steve Fetter, Nuclear Archaeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Production, Science &
Global Security, vol. 3, no. 3, 1993, pp. 237-259.
64 Department of Energy, Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States plutonium production, acquisition,
and utilization from 1944 to 1994, February 1996; see also Albright/Berkhout/Walker, op. cit. (fn 51).
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measurements.65 In the meantime, international efforts are concentrated particularly on
modernisation of material accounting and its adaptation to IAEA standards. In NNWS,
whose nuclear industry was subjected to international surveillance at an early stage, there
are also measuring inaccuracies, though on a smaller scale, the correctness of which is
taken to be reliable. As a supplement, measurements must be carried out on materials and
plants.
The same applies for these problems as for the verification of warhead stockpiles (section
3.1.3): we shall have to live with these discrepancies and inaccuracies. However, with
maximum transparency, utilisation of the most diverse sources of information and the
possibility of challenge inspections, it is highly probable that undeclared material storage
sites will be detected sooner or later, which also has a deterrent effect on frauds.
3.1.7Destruction or Conversion of Plants
The possession of nuclear weapons is not possible without regular maintenance in order to
guarantee functionality, reliability and safety. The reason for this is that warheads display
different effects of ageing:
1. The composition of plutonium alters as a result of radioactive decay. The isotope Pu-
241 which is contained (to a small degree) in plutonium decays to gaseous Am-241
(americium), which destroys the crystal structure.66 Depending on the level of the Pu-
241 content, the pit must, sooner or later, be replaced and the old plutonium cleaned of
americium. The time scale is 10-20 years. For this reason, warheads are dismantled and
reassembled at regular intervals. Both activities take place in warhead factories. In
addition, storage sites are required for warheads and components which have been
scrapped.
The same warhead factories and storage sites will also be used for dismantling
operations during the course of disarmament. As a first step, all these plants must be
declared. Most of them have already been known for a long time anyway. During
verification of the dismantlement of warheads, the measures specified above will then
be applied. These are the measures concerning for example the entrances and exits of
these plants, or the surveillance of transportation. The last step in nuclear disarmament
would then be the destruction of the plants and the conversion of the buildings,
followed by on-site inspections. On-site inspections must also be possible at any
random site in future, in order to make sure that no activities geared towards the
production of nuclear weapons can be carried out.
2. As a result of the radioactive radiation of the pits, electronic components and
conventional explosives are impaired. These must therefore be checked and replaced at
                                         
65 A. N. Roumyantsev, Establishing a SSAC in Russia: Structural, Organizational, Budgetary and Political
Problems, Conference on Fissile Material Security in the CIS, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige
Politik, Bonn, 7.-8. April 1997.
 66 The half-life of Pu-241 is 14.4 years. In comparison, that of Am-241 is 433 years. The typical content of
Pu-241 in American weapons plutonium counts as 0,35 %; op. cit. (fn 95). The americium enriches in
such a way that one third of the Pu-241 has decayed after 10 years, and almost two thirds after 20 years.
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regular intervals. As a result of further technological developments, older electronic
components are often no longer produced. For this reason, newly-constructed warheads
are often slightly modified and their functional capability has to be checked. This is
done with the help of so-called "hydrodynamic tests" and tests on components, for
which test sites are required.67 Formerly, nuclear testing was also carried out for this
purpose.
These activities must cease, at the latest, when the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free
world is complete. This will have to be controlled by means of on-site inspections of
former test sites. A range of these activities is ambivalent in character: testing plants
for conventional explosives can be used for hydrodynamic tests as well as for the
testing of conventional ammunition. In this case, arrangements for „controlled access“
must be made for challenge inspections. This verification instrument was developed as
part of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which represents a milestone in the
development of verification.68 On one hand, unlimited access is stipulated for
inspectors, on the other hand, plant operators are given the opportunity to protect
industrial secrets by, for example, covering up devices or locking away documents.
The details are jointly negotiated between operators and inspectors. By means of
environmental analyses, for example, it is possible to determine which materials have
been used. However, technical details need not be revealed simultaneously.
3. The tritium required for boosting decays with a half-life of approx. 12 years, and must
be regularly renewed. Simple nuclear warheads can also function without tritium.
Technically advanced warheads in nuclear weapon states are, however, reliant on
tritium. To abandon it would require the reconstruction of warheads, which, following
the conclusion of the CTBT, is only possible for very primitive models.
Various different technical possibilities are available for the production of tritium,
especially the production carried out with the aid of lithium-6 in reactors, the extraction
from the primary cooling cycle in heavy water reactors or spalation neutron sources.69
Most of these plants are also suitable for the production of plutonium. For this reason,
it is probable that, as a result of an FMCT, they will be subjected to verification
measures with the task, among others, of differentiating between plutonium and tritium
production. If a decision was made in favour of total nuclear disarmament, one
                                         
 67 Hydrodynamic experiments form part of those activities which are carried out in the NWS following the
test ban in order to maintain the nuclear arsenal.  In the USA activities of this kind are known as
“Stockpile Stewardship“. See e.g. JASON and the MITRE Corporation, Science Based Stockpile
Stewardship, Report JRS-94-345, November 1994. An overview is provided by Richard L. Garwin,
Stockpile Stewardship and the Nuclear Weapon Complexes, Pugwash Meeting no. 206, Moscow, 19-23
February 1995. See also: A. Schaper, The problem of definition: Just what is a nuclear test?, in: Eric
Arnett (ed.), Implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban: New Aspects of Definition, Organization and
Verification, SIPRI-Research Report (Oxford University Press), Oxford, 1994.
 68 Alexander Kelle, Das Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommen und seine Umsetzung – einführende Darstellung
und Stand der Diskussion, Frankfurt/M, (HSFK-Report no. 12), 1996. Walter Krutzsch/Ralf Trapp, A
Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Dordrecht/Boston/London (Martinus Nijhoff eds.)
1994.
 69 M. Kalinowski/L. Colschen, International Control of Tritium to Prevent its Horizontal Proliferation and
to Foster Nuclear Disarmament, Science and Global Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 1994/95, p. 130. cf. also
section 4.5.2: Tritium in Schaper, op. cit. (fn 50).
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consequence will also be a ban on the production of tritium for warhead purposes,
which would then have to be verified, too. 70
4. It is also necessary to maintain the level of qualification of a sufficient number of
scientists and technicians. For this purpose, regular training is required. On the
technical side, the handling of special materials, production technologies and tools
must be practised. On the scientific side, the trainees must intensively occupy
themselves with theoretical and experimental issues relating to nuclear weapon-
oriented problem areas which are hardly touched on in published literature (for further
details, see section 3.3.4 Theoretical Foundations). It is also necessary to recruit and
train the rising generation of qualified personnel.Continued employment of a number
of nuclear weapon specialists in a nuclear weapon  state beyond the point of total
nuclear disarmament holds a high risk of detection. The previous activity of these
experts is known to a large circle of people not easy to surv y. In rder to cover up the
fact that an option is secretly being kept up, one would have to work for a large-scale
creation of legends. The methods for this would be the same as in the case of secret
nuclear rearmament which is discussed in detail in the next chapter (cf. section 3.3.8
Secrecy and Creation of Legends). The probability of detection in terms of nuclear
weapon-orientated research activities can in addition be increased by the fact that large
research institutions must, in principle, be open for visiting international experts in the
same field.71 Thus, for example, the operation of the NIF laser fusion plant in
Livermore, USA, (as part of "Stockpile Stewardship") with the exclusion of non-
American colleagues, would no longer be permitted in a nuclear weapon free world.67
As has been demonstrated, the detection probability in terms of the continuation of
maintenance activities is very high. There remains the slight risk of non-detection that a
nuclear weapon state might retain a number of undeclared warheads. However, it is highly
unlikely that it would do so entirely without any maintenance facilities and personnel,
since, after only a short time, the functional capability and safety of this arsenal can no
longer be guaranteed. Thus the overall probability that incomplete nuclear disarmament
will not be detected is extremely small.72
                                         
 70 Kalinowski/Colschen, ibid.
71 This would accommodate a natural trend within scientific professions: residencies abroad are here
typical, and the personnel in large non-military research facilities is constantly internationally mixed.
72 There is the proposal of the "virtual nuclear arsenal" (Avner Cohen, Assessing Virtual Nuclear
Arsenals, Survival, vol. 40, no. 1, 1998 (Spring)): according to this, all warheads should be abolished,
but the nuclear complexes maintained in order to allow for rapid nuclear re-armament in the case of a
proliferation. The verification would, in this case, be considerably less convincing, since it would be
further hampered by a lack of transparency and a multitude of hardly clarifiable suspicious activities.
There are also objections on grounds of political security. See, e.g., Kelle, op. cit. (fn 19).
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3.2 Summary: How Reliable Can the Verification of Nuclear Disarmament Be ?
The overview outlined in this section shows that two tasks are involved. The first is the
verification that declared disarmament measures actually take place, and the second is
verification that declarations of stockpiles are complete.
The first task can be managed with a high degree of reliability by using technical means.
The crucial element here is the identification of warheads and the reliable distinction of
decoys. Accompanying methods are the secure protection of transports and the sealing of
containers. Technologies and methods in this respect are so advanced that their principle
feasibility and the high degree of reliability need not be doubted. One difficulty is the
problem of the secrecy of many technical details. It would, however, be possible to
overcome this problem with a combination of political and technical methods. An
important principle is that of the closed factory with a verified entrance and verified exit. A
prerequisite which would greatly simplify the task is a dramatic rise in transparency in the
participating states (cf. section 5.1.2 Secrecy versus Transparency). The conclusion can be
drawn that the impending further steps of nuclear disarmament, for example a START-III
treaty, could be verified with a satisfactory degree of accuracy, provided that there is the
political will. Verification measures can also be introduced and developed step by step in
the same way as the disarmament measures themselves. Each new measure can build on
previously gained experience.73
The second task, the verification that no warheads and no nuclear material remain, cannot
be mastered solely with technical means. Technological methods can be employed in the
case of a concrete suspicion: specially trained inspectors with the relevant equipment
would be in a position to find and identify warheads at a concrete location. There is no
guarantee, however, that suspicions will actually arise. It is only possible to raise the level
of probability for this. The following factors are important in this respect:
1. The highest possible level of transparency of production histories, i.e., above all,
voluntary declarations and documentation, the publication of historical documents and
the possibility of interviews with former employees.
2. Full exploitation of all technological possibilities for verification, including, in
particular, aerial reconnaissance and environmental measurements, furthermore, the
possibility of involving National Technical Means (NTM), including secret services.
3. Freedom of the press and a democratic climate which, in the case of non-compliance
with international obligations, would generate a corresponding sense of injustice in
those individuals involved.
4. The possibility of forcing clarification, if necessary, in the case of suspicion, i.e., the
impossibility of rejecting challenge inspections.
5. International trust, resulting in the fact that quantitative disagreements would be
realistically evaluated.
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Each of these factors, taken individually, is a necessary prerequisite for the verification of
total nuclear disarmament. Together, they would improve verification to such an extent
that we could talk about sufficient criteria.
3.3 Tasks and Methods of Early Detection of the Various Different Elements of Secret
Nuclear Weapons Programs
The task of early detection of an attempt at nuclear rearmament will never, even in a
nuclear weapon free world, become obsolete. Since nuclear weapons cannot be un-
invented,74 and since, as a result of the close link between non-military and military uses of
nuclear energy, it would always be possible to overcome the technical hurdles for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the world will always have to live with permanent
verification, even after comprehensive nuclear disarmament. This is already the case in the
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) party to the NPT, who have undertaken to relinquish
the right to use or own nuclear weapons and to allow this to be verified by the IAEA. The
IAEA safeguards have been reformed and improved on the basis of decades of experience.
They have also become more intrusive.
In a nuclear weapon free world, these requirements would be even higher. As with every
verification however, it is not possible to be one hundred percent certain. The remaining
uncertainty has always been reduced in the course of time, but it is fundamentally
impossible to eliminate it altogether. The degree of uncertainty which can still be tolerated
in the case of a nuclear-weapon-free world lies below that of a world in which some
nuclear weapon states still exist. In conjunction with far-reaching nuclear disarmament, the
present verification system must therefore also be developed to such an extent that it will
be acknowledged by the international community75 To what extent uncertainties can be
tolerated depends in this instance firstly on the degree of international trust, which states
have acquired over the course of time. Secondly, it depends on the effectiveness of
countermeasures which can be resorted to in the event of an attempt at secret nuclear
rearmament. The aim of a further extension must be to detect potential treaty violators as
early as possible rather than to increase the expenditure on verification in reliable member
states.
                                         
74 There have been considerations which assume the possibility of the disappearance of the technical
knowledge of nuclear weapons: Donald MacKenzie/Graham Spinardi, Tacit Knowledge, Weapons
Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons, American Journal of Sciences, vol. 101, no. 1, July
1996´5, pp. 44-99. In a nuclear-weapon-free world, a large number of technical skills would in fact
disappear. These considerations are, however, according to our opinion only correct for the engineers‘
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numerous possibilities for transferring scientific and technical knowledge from non-military areas to
nuclear weapons should not be underestimated.
75 At present there is a large number of critics who consider the present system to be insufficient, and who
have influence on the political elites of their countries: Lü Chenxi; How High is the Threshold for Japan
to Develop Nuclear Weapons?; Paper for the 8th International Summer Symposium on Science and
World Affairs, Beijing, July 23-31, 1996; Paul Leventhal, Latent and Blatant Proliferation: Does the
NPT Work Against Either?, Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, 1990. It is, in principle, not possible
to satisfy all critics, but it is necessary to have the recognition of the majority of all political elites.
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Different from former nuclear weapon states, a new beginner would first have to work out
the scientific foundations for the construction of nuclear weapons. His first nuclear weapon
would be based on a technically quite simple construction principle. A state cannot build a
hydrogen bomb until it has not only mastered the construction of simple nuclear fission
bombs, but can also exactly predict the yield. Computer simulations and part experiments
are inadequate for this. It would also be necessary to carry out some experimental nuclear
explosions with the prototypes for primaries, which would be detected by the verification
apparatus of the CTBT (see appendix: functioning of nuclear weapons).76 Hence
verification must concentrate primarily on activities connected with the secret construction
of a simple nuclear fission bomb.
Additionally, the possibility cannot be ruled out that a proliferator acquires the necessary
knowledge from nuclear weapon states by way of espionage. In this case, he would
theoretically be in a position to bypass some of the research and development activities and
select a technically more advanced design. In the case of a nuclear weapon free world, the
documents and skills still in existence would, however, in the long term be reduced to the
minimum required for future arms control. But even in this case, a technical infrastructure
and production would first have to be developed. Early detection of the latter is the task of
verification.
A prerequisite is the universality of the commitment to relinquish nuclear weapons, and the
verification thereof. The verification authorities must have the same rights in all states. In a
nuclear weapon free world, the overwhelming majority of states will not develop any
ambitions in terms of nuclear weapons, just as today there is no doubt about the contractual
fidelity of almost all non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT. There can, however, always be
a small number of treaty violators. Whether verification in a nuclear weapon free world is
possible depends crucially on whether these treaty violators are detected in time. In the
following, we describe the acquisition strategies for different elements of a secret nuclear
weapon program and the measures needed for their detection.77
3.3.1High Enriched Uranium (HEU)
For a nuclear weapons program in a beginner state, there are, in principle, two alternative
lines of technical development: either the acquisition of the nuclear weapon material
plutonium or the nuclear weapon material HEU.
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77 Office of Technology Assessment, UnitedSta s Congress, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass
Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993; A.
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Natural uranium, i.e., that which can be found in nature, consists of 99.3 per cent of the
isotope U-238, and 0.7 per cent of U-235. It is not suitable for a chain reaction in a nuclear
explosion since the content of U-235 has to be considerably higher – at least 20 per cent.
For nuclear weapons, a content of 90% or more is typical.78 The isotope composition of
uranium must therefore be artificially modified. The technologies used for this are called
enrichment technologies.79 There are a number of different enrichment technologies, which
are based on different principles, display a varyingly high level of technical requireme ts,
have a varying distribution, and also have different detection probabilities in the event of a
secret operation.  The most important known enrichment processes are: gas diffusion
enrichment, gas centrifuge enrichment, jet nozzle enrichment, chemical enrichment,
electromagnetic enrichment (EMIS) and laser isotope enrichment (AVLIS) (cf. appendix
B: A comparison of enrichment processes). In  principle, it is not impossible, although not
very likely, that a proliferator could succeed in discovering a new, previously unknown
process, and be able to develop it to the point where it can be used.
Enrichment technology is not only used for military purposes, but also in the non-military
production of nuclear energy. Most nuclear reactors need low enriched uranium (LEU) as
fuel. This contains approx. 3 – 5 per cent U-235, less than in HEU, but more than in natural
uranium. It is itself not suitable for weapons, but the same enrichment technologies are
used for its production as for the production of HEU. But an LEU production plant is
configured somewhat differently to one for the production of HEU: one enrichment
element, for example centrifuge or jet nozzle, is normally only capable of enriching the
material by a small fraction.80 For this reason, many elements have to be connected in
series, and due to the required amounts, also in parallel. The enrichment of the end product
results from this arrangement. The mere construction of a plant shows whether it is used
for the production of HEU or LEU. Reconstruction is possible in principle, but takes a long
time. A state that has access to non-military enrichment technology is therefore in principle
also able to produce HEU for military use. It is, however, extremely unlikely that an
enrichment plant which is already subject to IAEA safeguards would be used for the
production of HEU instead of LEU without this being detected, if inspections take place
often enough. The alternative method would therefore be to build a secret plant.
A state which had no previous access to enrichment technology would first have to acquire
this by developing it themselves, either with or without external help. Due to the danger of
misuse for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, important technical details are kept
secret so that most processes can only be developed by industrial countries without
external help. These processes also include the most wide-spread processes of gas
diffusion and gas centrifuges. Both pose a considerable technical hurdle for less developed
                                         
78 The smaller this proportion, the larger is the amount required for the production of a wa head, a d the
more cumbersome and technically elaborate is warhead. cf. appendix III, Glossary of technical and legal
terms, in Schaper, op. cit. (fn 50).
79 Allan S. Krass/Peter Boskma/Boelie Elzen/Wim A. Smit, "Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon
Proliferation" (Taylor & Francis), London 1983
80 The size of this fraction is given by the so-called “separation factor“. cf. table 3: Enrichment Processes
in Comparison. The smaller it is, the larger is the number of necessary enrichment elements.
29
countries, so that the latter are reliant on external help such as the legal or illegal transfer of
technology, smuggling, espionage or treason on the part of foreign experts. Other
enrichment technologies are comparatively easy to master and can be developed by less
industrialised countries without external help. One example is electromagnetic enrichment
with the aid of so called “calutrons“, which Iraq had worked on as part of its program.
Nevertheless, even with simpler technologies, the costs in terms of technology, finance,
time and logistics that are required to produce sufficient amounts should not be
underestimated. In a secret nuclear weapons program which is to use HEU, a proliferator
would therefore have several options:81
1. Direct diversion: He could attempt to divert HEU directly, for example from non-
military use as a fuel for special research reactors82, from the military application as
fuel for submarine reactors83 or from a previously unknown stockpile which is not
subject to safeguards.
To detect the first scenario, diversion from a research reactor, sufficiently frequent
inspections are necessary, so that the time-span between diversion and detection
remains short enough.84
The HEU for military submarines could prove a problem.85 A verification regime
would have to ensure that illegal diversion for nuclear weapons was discovered early
enough. Due to the military character of the material, conflicts regarding the degree of
transparency are likely. The same problem is bound to arise during the negotiations for
the FMCT, which can therefore provide lessons for future measures. One possibility to
at least ease this problem would be to relinquish the use of very highly enriched HEU
(over 90%) in submarines, and to replace this with less highly enriched uranium. At
least unverified stock-keeping would no longer be allowed. The same considerations
apply in the case of the detection of undeclared fissile material storage sites as they do
in the case of the detection of undeclared warheads (cf. section 3.1.3).
                                         
81 Cf. Tom E. Shea, Verifying a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off: Safeguarding Reprocessing and
Enrichment Plants: Current and Future Practices, Seminar on Safeguards and Non-Proliferation, IAEA
Headquarters, November 16-17, 1995.
 82 Such research reactors are rare. Most of them will have reached the ends of their operating lives within
the next couple of years. The only research reactor to be newly built since a moratorium 20 years ago, is
the planned FRM-II in Garching.
 83 At present, this does not exist in any NNWS which is a member of the NPT, although, theoretically, it
would have the right to possess such fuel.
 84 Iraq had planned to use its HEU, which it had imported for use in research reactors, in a crash program.
The inspections only took place every half year, so it would have had enough time and material to build
one or two warheads. Cf. section 4.2 Iraq: Attempted Violation of the NPT and the literature quoted
therein
 85 See the more detailed discussion given in chapter 4.5.1: Specific verification problems – Naval fuel in:
Schaper, op. cit. (fn 50). Very highly enriched uranium as is required for nuclear weapons is only used
in submarines in the USA and Great Britain. Less highly enriched uranium, e.g. the 45% which is used
in many Russian submarines is also legally classified as HEU. Nuclear weapons would, however,
require a much greater degree of technical expenditure. The danger of proliferation is thus lower. The
French submarines run on only 7% enriched uranium.
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2. Smuggling: He could attempt to acquire this material on a potential black market.
These activities can be detected by authorities such as the police, customs or secret
services. There is always a certain probability of discovery, but this will never be one
hundred percent. It has been increased as a consequence of several incidents in the last
few years, mainly by the improved training and equipment of the relevant authorities,
improved security and improved international co-operation.86 Int national awareness
of the problem has grown in the meantime. Countries which are in this respect poorly
equipped are especially suitable as trans-shipment locations. For this reason it will be
necessary in a nuclear weapon free world to extend routine international co-operations.
3. The use of non-military plants: He could attempt to misuse an already existing non-
military plant secretly for military purposes. In this connection there are two varieties:
the plant already produces non-military HEU, or it produces LEU and would have to be
correspondingly converted. This is the scenario traditionally aimed at by the IAEA
safeguards. The probability of detection has continually risen as a result of many
technical improvements. Ultimately, it is restricted by the finiteness of the financial
resources.
4. The building of his own secret plants: He could attempt to build his own secret plant
himself without external help. In this instance, he would either use existing non-
military technology, or develop his own enrichment process. The more advanced the
industrialisation of this state, the greater is the selection of possible enrichment
processes for its own development.
According to the safeguards reform S3, a state undertakes to declare such plants
already before they are loaded with nuclear material.87 Th  reform also aims at
developing as much transparency as possible regarding the relevant industries of
member states. The necessity for protection of industrial secrets poses a problem here.88
This problem is typical of verification, and not only in the nuclear area. Verification
must here make use of  challenge inspections with controlled access according to the
CWC model (cf. section 3.1.7). In the CWC case, the aim is to verify the absence of
forbidden activities. In the case of enrichment, the aim would be to verify that there are
no undeclared preparations for enrichment processes, depending on the exact terms of
the scope in a future treaty.
                                         
86 As with the combating of other forms of crime, there will always be a limit in rights of access for the
authorities in order to protect individual privacy.
 87 This was not the case before the r form. Plants were first registered at the IAEA once they were loaded
with nuclear material.
 88 This was also a point of dispute during the negotiations towards S'3. Extensive transparency measures
and declaration obligations were originally proposed in non-nuclear areas of technology which are
relevant for enriching and reprocessing. However, these plans were cut after a group of non-nuclear
weapons states complained about the competitive disadvantage as against the nuclear weapons states
due to increased risk of industrial espionage, and demanded universality in this measure. The reason for
this reticence was, above all, the prospect of having to introduce similar measures in the nuclear
weapons states, with the probable result that there would be resistance from industry here too. This is
illustrated by: Statement by the Utilities Employing Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Industry in
Germany on the IAEA Programme 93+2, 3 June 1996.
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A further possibility is of course that these activities are detected by NTM. Secret
service activities in this area are, however, also ambivalent since they can be
accompanied by industrial espionage. Hence, the legitimisation of these activities also
has its limitations.
5. The construction of a secret plant with foreign help: He could attempt to build a
secret plant with external help. In this connection, he would attempt to minimise the
extent of this help in order to minimise the probability of discovery. The typical
acquisition activities for this and the chances of their detection are described in section
3.3.7 Acquisition Activities. Plants can be detected with the aid of satellites. In the case
of the construction of an underground plant the excavation would arouse suspicion.
6. Operation: Following completion of a plant, he has to start up the operation and
produce sufficient HEU. Raw materials (either natural uranium or LEU) have to be
acquired or diverted for this. Stockpiles of natural uranium are to be found all over the
world, and new deposits can always be discovered.
Most enrichment processes use the chemical compound uranium hexafluoride (UF6),
which is volatile. Unless elaborately shielded, UF6 can be detected by means of
atmospheric measurements adjacent to a plant, or by using so-called LIDAR techniques
(Light Detection and Ranging).89 LIDAR techniques examine laser light reflected by
the atmosphere using spectral analysis methods. Some of these techniques are included
in the S3. LIDAR can also be operated from satellites, but at present this only takes
place in the form of NTM in some states. There is no other application for UF6 apart
from enrichment. Atmospheric measurements can also detect whether HEU has been
enriched. Some processes, in particular AVLIS and EMIS, use no volatile materials,
and it could be easier to hide them. But EMIS would require a high power and could
therefore be detected by means of infrared pictures, for example from a satellite. Had
Iraq’s calutrons already been in operation, this would have been detected. To hide the
heat production, an elaborate underground cooling system would have to be installed,
or the plant would have to be built as part of another plant which also had a high
power. In the latter case however, there would again be more accessories.  The
enrichment method which would be the easiest to hide is AVLIS, because it gives off
little energy and releases no telltale gases. On the other hand, it is technically the most
elaborate process, and can only be mastered by a few industrialised states.90 How ver,
should a proliferator succeed in stealing this technology, the probability of detection is
extremely low. In principle, we cannot rule out the possibility that he invents a new
process. The thing all these processes have in common however, is that traces of HEU
are present in the plants, which are detectable during an on-site inspection. Initial
suspicion can always be aroused, as described above.
                                         
89 In the USA an extensive R&D-program for improvement of the NTM, is carried out: CALIOPE
(Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents). See Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
(Chair), Report of the Comprehensive Research and Development Review Committee for the U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, June 8, 1996.
90 After many years of R&D, the building of a demonstration plant has begun in the USA: Atomwirtschaft,
volume 43, June 1998, p. 418.
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3.3.2Plutonium
The method used to produce plutonium is the reprocessing of spent fuel, as was attempted,
for example, by North Korea.91 The principle of reprocessing shall be briefly described
here: spent fuel accrues as a result of normal operation in most nuclear reactors,
particularly those containing LEU fuel. During operation of the reactor, the U-235
contained in the fuel is fissioned by the impinging neutrons. The U-238 cores, however,
are not fissioned, but transformed into plutonium  239 (Pu-239) as a result of a chain
reaction with the neutrons. If a neutron comes into contact with a Pu-239 core, the latter is
either also fissioned, or the neutron combines with the core, forming Pu-240. The longer
the fuel remains in the reactor, the higher the proportion of plutonium isotopes (Pu-240,
Pu-241, and Pu-242 etc.) becomes. Spent fuel thus contains the following components:
remains of unfissioned U-235 and unaltered U-238, plutonium which is composed of
various different isotopes, and the fissile products. The latter consist of a whole range of
different chemical elements which, to a larger or lesser degree, are radioactive.  The aim of
reprocessing is the separation of plutonium, uranium and the radioactive fissile products.
The most effective and most widely used process is called PUREX (plutonium and
uranium recovery by extraction). Apart from mechanical comminution methods at the
outset, chemical separation processes are used. The crucial difference between a chemical
factory and a reprocessing plant is the high degree of radioactivity, which poses a danger
both for the workers and the environment. Not only must the fuel elements be stored for
years after removal from the reactor so that the most potent radioactivity can decay,92 but
reprocessing plants must above all also implement extensive protection against radiation.
Typical radiation protection technology are, for example, hot cells. The expense depends to
a certain extent on the standards of radiation protection, and thus also on the
unscrupulousness of a proliferator.
In principle, non-military nuclear energy can manage without separated plutonium, since
spent fuel elements from almost all reactor types could be put into final storage without
being reprocessed. This use of nuclear energy is known as “open fuel cycle“. If spent
nuclear material is reprocessed, this is termed a “closed fuel cycle“. The nuclear weapon
material plutonium only accumulates in a closed fuel cycle, that is, only here is use made
of reprocessing, its production technology. Were there no non-military reprocessing, an
important route for the acquisition of nuclear weapons material, i.e., diversion from non-
military utilisation, would be cut off. In fact, however, plutonium and its reprocessing is
used to a considerable extent for non-military purposes. In this respect, there are various
different technologies, in particular the reactor type “rapid breeding“ , which can make use
of fuel with a high Pu content, and fuel containing plutonium for light-water reactors, so-
called mixed oxide fuel (MOX). Countries which today use plutonium for non-military
purposes, or wish to keep this option, include Belgium, China, France, Germany, Great
Britain, India, Japan and Russia.
                                         
91 A detailed and easily understandable introduction to the technical aspects of plutonium is offered by:
Nuclear Energy Agency, Plutonium Fuel – An Assessment, OECD, Paris 1989.
92 The radioactivity is reduced due to the fact that the elements with the highest levels of radiation decay
fastest.
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Although the USA operate an open fuel cycle for reasons of non-proliferation, and even
pursue the declared policy of trying to win others over to this, it is unrealistic to believe in
the implementation of an international consensus for the abolition of non-military
utilisation of plutonium in the foreseeable future. In reflections on the subject of
comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the demand can be found that it ought to be
combined with the abolition of non-military use of plutonium.93 Acceptance of the latter is,
however, much more unlikely than acceptance of the abolition of only military utilisation.94
A combination would create an additional obstacle along the route towards comprehensive
nuclear disarmament. As long as it can be guaranteed that plutonium can only be used for
non-military purposes, it could also be produced and used in a nuclear weapon free world.
An essential prerequisite in this instance is a working verification which is able to detect
any illegal diversion early enough and with sufficient probability.
If a proliferator attaches great importance to a high Pu-239 content, he will use spent fuel
elements which have only briefly been exposed to radiation as his source material, i.e. he
will unload a nuclear reactor early.95 This ought to trigger a more precise control of the
whereabouts of the fuel. An alternative would be radiation-exposed fuel from rapid
breeders since, for reasons of nuclear physics, this has a particularly high Pu-239 content
and contains almost no heavy isotopes. Plutonium enrichment is technically very
sophisticated since the difference in mass between the isotopes is less than in the case of
uranium.96
The technology of reprocessing is the same for both non-military and military uses of
plutonium.97 A state which had no previous access to reprocessing technology would first
have to acquire this, by way of its own development, either with or without external help.
The technological hurdle is, in principle, lower than in the case of enrichment. However, if
detection is to be avoided, extremely sophisticated shielding measures are necessary to
avoid the escape of telltale traces of radioactivity. The reason for this is that reprocessing
                                         
93 INESAP, Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Wo ld, April 1995, pp. 80ff.
94 On the subject of the acceptance of a nuclear-weapon-free world, see: H. Müller/K. Frank/A. Kelle/S.
Meier/A. Schaper: Nukleare Abrüstung - mit welcher Perspektive? Der internationale Diskurs über die
nukleare Rüstungskontrolle und die Vision einer kernwaffenfreien Welt, Frankfurt/M. (HSFK-Report
no. 8), 1996. The acceptance of the abolition of military uses of plutonium is widespread, as is clear
from the many positive statements on the issue of a Cut-off, above all from governments of countries in
which plutonium is used for non-military purposes.
95 This has several technical advantages. Theoretically however, also so-called reactor plutonium with
lower Pu-239 content can be used for the production of nuclear weapons. This has been demonstrated
by: Egbert Kankeleit/Christian Küppers/Ulrich Imkeller, Bericht zur Waffentauglichkeit von
Reaktorplutonium, Report IANUS-1/1989., then by Carson Mark, Explosive Properties of Reactor-
Grade Plutonium, Science & Global Security, vol. 4, 1993, p. 111.
96 In 1994, a small sample of smuggled plutonium from Russia was discovered in Tengen which consisted
of enriched plutonium. On the basis of its isotope composition, it was possible to determine that it was
enriched by means of centrifuge.  It is possible to speculate that Russian warheads made of this material
exist. This is further supported by the fact that Russian warheads are said to be welded not screwed. This
is only possible with very pure plutonium which hardly shows any ageing effects (americium
construction) and can be used for many years.
97 Small variations can arise due to the fact that the critical mass is, to a small degree, dependent on the
isotope composition. This can influence the tolerance limits for the avoidance of criticality accidents.
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releases a much greater quantity of telltale gases than enrichment, hardly any being inert
gases which can be shielded. They can be distributed and detected over great distances. 98
Methods include the taking of air samples or LIDAR from aeroplanes or satellites.99
Shielding measures would again substantially increase the expense and, depending on the
proliferator's level of development, requires the additional transfer of technology. They
would also only reduce, but not totally eliminate the emissions.
In a nuclear weapons program which is intended to make use of plutonium, a proliferator
would thus have several options, and there are correspondingly several methods of
verification.100 The acquisition scenarios are similar to those for HEU, i.e. direct diversion
(from fuel production or from unknown storage sites), smuggling, use of non-military
plants, construction of a secret plant either on his own initiative or with foreign aid (with
the somewhat different kind of dependence on outside help specified above) and operation.
By way of verification that no banned reprocessing takes place, there are additional
methods, apart from the measurement of radioactivity in the environment, which are also
applied by the IAEA, namely safeguards in the entire fuel cycle, and also, for example, in
nuclear energy plants and facilities which do not directly contain weapon-grade material.
This increases the probability of detecting banned activities essentially.
3.3.3Ignition Technology
In addition to the acquisition of nuclear material, a proliferator will attempt to develop
ignition technology for nuclear weapons. In this connection, there are two technological
alternatives for beginners: the “gun assembly technique“, according to which, two halves
of a sphere of HEU are combined by shooting them together so that an overcritical mass is
created, and the “implosion technique“ in which a hollow sphere of HEU or Pu is evenly
imploded and compressed with the aid of conventional explosives. For technical reasons,
the gun assembly technique can only be applied to HEU, whereas the implosion technique
can be used with both HEU and Pu.101
                                         
98 Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the U.S., Environmental Monitoring for Nuclear
Safeguards, OTA-BP-ISS-168, Washington, D.C, September 1995; seven contributions to the
convention on "Strengthened and more cost effective safeguards" of the symposium on International
Nuclear Safeguards concern themselves with the measurement of radionuclines in the environment, see
proceedings of this symposium,; op. cit. (fn 77), pp. 411-475, Charles W. Nakleh/William D.
Stanbro/Louis N. Hand/R. T. Perry, Jr./William B. Wilson/Bryan L. Fearey, Nobel-Gas Atmospheric
Monitoring for International Safeguards at Reprocessing Facilities, Science & Global Security, vol. 6,
no. 3, pp. 357-379, 1997; Martin B. Kalinowski/Hartmut Sartorius/Stefan Uhl/Wolfgang Weiss,
Rückschließbarkeit auf Plutoniumabtrennungen durch Auswertung von Messungen des atmospärischen
Krypton-85 in Wochenproben bei verschiedenen Abständen von der Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage
Karlsruhe, IANUS 3/1998. In the USA there is a range of R&D programs designed to improve the
techniques. In 1996 they were promoted with the sum of  US $ 194.4 m. Panofsky, op. cit. (fn 89).
99 Op. cit. (fn 89).
100Op. cit. (fn 81).
101The reason is that in implosion technology, the critical mass is reached much more quickly than with the
gun assembly technique, i.e. within a few microseconds instead of milliseconds. Plutonium can only be
used when the compression time is very short, since it has a much higher spontaneous fission rate than
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The acquisition or production of material and of the ignition system can take place parallel
and independently of each other up to the point of application, since they both use
completely different techniques. This applies both to the gun assembly technique and the
implosion technique. In the experiments necessary for their development, non-fissile
material is used instead. With the use of computer simulations, conclusions can be drawn
on the results in terms of whether the warhead with fissile material would have ignited.
The more accurate these computer simulations are, the more accurate the prediction on the
yield becomes, too.
The technical expenditure in the case of the gun assembly technique is lower than in the
case of the implosion technique, but large-scale development work is still required at the
engineer level. In principle, even less industrialised countries can develop this technology
without external help since no high technology that is difficult either to produce or to
acquire is required. However, HEU must be used as the fissile material, and its
manufacture poses greater technical requirements than that of plutonium. The necessary
amount is also much higher than that required for a warhead based on the implosion
principle. This route will thus only be trodden by a state which has access to large
quantities of HEU. An example of a case of this kind of proliferation is South Africa (cf.
section 4.1). Warheads based on the gun assembly principle are so heavy that missiles are
not an option as carriers. This principle has not been used anymore for decades in nuclear
weapons states.
In the case of the implosion technique, the technical requirements are higher. This is
particularly attributed to the fact that compression is only possible if the implosion is
taking place in a perfectly spherical way. This requires a precise arrangement of spherical
symmetry and the generation of spherical, inward-moving shock waves. So-called
“explosive lenses“ are used for this purposes. Explosive lenses are composed of specially
formed pieces of different conventional explosives. All the explosive lenses used in the
arrangement must in addition be detonated simultaneously. In this instance, the permissible
imprecision in terms of time may only be a matter of microseconds.  The relevant
techniques for this cannot simply be acquired on the world market, and the technical
requirements in the case of domestic development are high. In preliminary tests, a
proliferator will first of all attempt to generate even shock waves. An example of such a
program is provided by Iraq (cf. section 4.2), which, after several years of research work,
had still not overcome this problem. Examples of the technologies required for the
generation of shaped shock waves are: flash x-ray machines102, high energy short-time
switches, or metallurgy with the heavy m tals used. If these technologies cannot be
produced domestically, which can be the case in less industrialised countries, they must be
acquired on the international world markets.103 Terrain suitable for experiments with
explosions is also required.
                                                                                                                     
HEU, and thus the probability of early detonation with only low release of energy would rise if longer
compression times were used.
102F. Jamet, G. Thomer, "Flash Radiography", Amsterdam 1976.
103All these technologies are subject to export restrictions.
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There is an important difference between the acquisition of ignition technology and the
acquisition of fissile materials. If all the necessary technical expertise is available, and blue
prints are in existence, an ignition device can be constructed with relatively low effort and
expenditure. The necessary materials and components, for example, conventional high
explosives and high-energy short-time switches are comparatively easy to acquire or
produce, whereas the technical effort required in the production of plutonium or HEU is
very high, even if the procedure is known. Nevertheless, acquisition activities in this
direction would pose grounds for suspicion which must be taken seriously.
Whereas spherical shock waves have just one application, i.e. implosion technology for
nuclear weapons, there are a great variety of applications for the preparatory experiments
in terms of generation of even and other-shaped shock waves.104 Non-military research is
included here105, and, above all, conventional military research. One frequent application is
in shaped charges with an anti-tank impact.106 It would not be possible to distinguish
between legitimate experiments on shock waves and illegitimate experiments on spherical
shock waves until research had reached a fairly advanced stage, i.e. when the shock waves
generated take on a spherical form. In the next step, materials would be compressed. These
experiments represent the hydrodynamic tests mentioned in section 3.1.7. Thus, if during
an on-site inspection of this kind of test site it could be proved that experiments on
spherical implosion had taken place, this would be an unequivocal indicator. After an
experiment, however, the components involved are of course destroyed, so that proof of
this kind would be hard to come by, even in the case of an on-site inspection. Additional
documentation and test drawings or the inspection of the test construction prior to the
explosion would have to be consulted. Here again, we are confronted with the problem of
protecting not only industrial, but also military secrets. It is the task of more specific
studies to examine to what degree challenge inspections with controlled access according
to the CWC model could be applied here.
In a nuclear weapons program which is to use the implosion technique, a proliferator
would therefore have several options, namely smuggling of components, recruitment of
former nuclear weapons experts, and R&D, either with or without the transfer of
technolgy with outside aid, disguised as R&D for conventional military technology.
Which one he chooses depends on his level of industrialisation. If a future verification
system is to take account not only of the acquisition of the ignition technology, but also of
the fissile material, at least a certain probability must be ensured that each of these
                                         
104Flat shock waves are generated with the aid of so called “flyer plates“. See, e.g. Hans-Rudolf Kleinhanß,
F. Lungenstraß und Helmut Zöllner, "Initiation Threshold of High Explosives in Small Flyer Plate
Experiments'', Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Detonation, Portland, Oregon, USA, August 28
- September 1, 1989, p., 66 and Hans-Rudolf Kleinhanß, Stoßwellen, lecture, University of Düsseldorf,
summer semester 1979. Iraqi scientists also took part in the symposium in Portland.
105E.g. for an explosive generator for the generation of short-time high current pulses which can be d in
plasma physics. One example of cylinder shaped shock waves is provided by Herbert Scholes,
Untersuchungen zur Stromverstärkung durch magnetische Flußkompression in einem koaxialen
Explosivgenerator, PhD thesis, University of Düsseldorf, 1982.
106See, e.g. Rheinmetall, Hohlladungsgeschosse, in: Waffentechnisches Taschenbuch, 9th edition,
Ratingen 1995, pp. 474 f.
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activities will be detected. As long as there is a high enough probability of early detection
of the acquisition or diversion of HEU or Pu, the detection of ignition technology activities
can assume a secondary role. Of course, it is desirable to achieve the highest possible level
of probability. Theoretically, even  smaller explosions could be detected with the aid of
microphones, but due to the vast number of conventional explosions taking place
worldwide, the expense would be out of all proportion.107 The applicability of challenge
inspections or random checks should at least be investigated in more detail. Although a
former nuclear weapon state does not require such an extensive development program, it
too would have to carry out the accompanying hydrodynamic tests in the event of secret
nuclear rearmament. The extent of these tests will increase, the longer ago the disarmament
phase was, and the higher the amount of documentation, infrastructure and informal
knowledge is which has already disappeared or been destroyed.
3.3.4Theoretical Foundations
The evaluation of measurement data emanating from hydrodynamic tests requires
extensive theoretical work, including computer simulations. It must be calculated firstly,
how the neutrons in a chain reaction would have multiplied if Pu or HEU had been used,
secondly, how the material would have been heated and how the energy would have been
distributed and spread, and thirdly, how the compression would have slowed and reversed
as a result of the increasing energy density. All three processes mutually influence each
other and can therefore not be calculated or simulated separately, although theories from
very different areas must be applied in each case.108
All three areas also require knowledge of special material characteristics, namely those of
plutonium or uranium at extremely high temperatures and pressures. Many of these
parameters necessary for the calculation have only been measured in connection with
research on nuclear weapons, for example, during underground nuclear tests, and have
never been published.109 Hence, approximate theoretical figures would have to be
acceptable in this case. However, since a beginner is satisfied with knowing whether a
concept for a warhead would actually function, and since he would not attach great
importance to an accurate prediction of the yield, approximations also suffice as far as he is
concerned. State-of-the-art PCs are incomparably more suitable for extensive numerical
calculations than, for example, the first computers which were available in the early days
of the American nuclear weapons program.
                                         
107To what extent conventional explosions are to be measured and checked to ensure that they are not
nuclear explosions was also a theme in the negotiations for the CTBT. Due to the large number of
explosions taking place every day, systematic recording was rejected. The yield here taken into account
was vastly above that which would be used in hydrodynamic tests.
108The multiplication of neutrons is calculated with the use of core physics theories, the temperature
distribution and dissipation with the aid of  theories from the field of astrophysics, and the implosion
and expansion of the plasma by means of hydrodynamic theories.
109These include especially cross sections for nuclear reactors, opacities and equations of state.
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Although details of the calculation for nuclear weapon ignition cannot be found in
published literature, here too, there are related fields of non-military science, which a
proliferator could exploit, and which would enable him to develop a theoretical model of a
nuclear weapon. These fields include especially nuclear physics, astrophysics, i.e., the
physics of the interiors of fixed stars, high-energy plasma physics (for example, inertial
confinement fusion (ICF)), shock wave physics, and fluid mechanics). The starting point
for the theoretical work, i.e. the fundamental principle, has long since been published.110
A beginner would have several options to work out the theoretical background for his
nuclear weapons program. Which one he chooses would depend on the degree of his
scientific – technical development. He would initially attempt to obtain the commitment of
scientists from related non-military areas for this work. He will start by recruiting people
of his own nationality, and will then, if necessary, with their help be able to recruit
additional foreign colleagues. He would probably minimise the number of foreign
employees in order to reduce the risk of detection. It is probable that these experts will
have studied or worked abroad and co-operated and communicated with foreign colleagues
from time to time. For this reason, it can be conspicuous if several scientists qualified in
the fields specified above withdraw from their international scientific communities. In the
context of other proliferation activities, this could be evaluated as a suspicious indication.
Possible additional activities include specific espionage and attempts to recruit scientists
from former nuclear weapon complexes. Verification would have the task of increasing the
detection probability of these operations, and of putting individual observations into
context. The larger and more advanced the scientific infrastructure of a state is, the less
obvious such suspicious indications become. Methods include the observation of
international scientific communities and secret service methods. Last but not least, any
attempt to recruit a scientist runs the risk that he will inform a foreign secret service or the
verification authority (cf. section 3.3.6).
3.3.5Nuclear Testing
In principle, a simple nuclear weapon can be developed without any nuclear tests. The
R&D methods specified in section 3.3.3 Ignition Techniques, e. g. hydrodynamic testing,
suffice. A beginner is not interested, at least not initially, in an accurate measurement of
the yield or of the physical parameters of the explosion. But there are, nevertheless, two
reasons for nuclear tests: a state could be interested in further developing an already
existing capacity, for example, to bridge the gap in the direction of hydrogen bombs, which
is impossible without a few nuclear tests111, and he may be politically interested in
demonstrating his capabilities to the world. The former assumes that previous activities
have not been detected.
                                         
110Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, Berkeley (University of California Press), 1992.
111Op. cit. (fn 76).
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The task of verification is to detect and identify a nuclear test. This is accomplished by the
verification of the CTBT, for which a department is currently being established in
Vienna.112
Furthermore, in a nuclear weapon free world, even the preparation for a test must be
detected in the early stages. NTM, and satellite pictures in particular, are suitable for this.113
In the long term, as many of the methods which are today still under the direction of NTM
ought to be internationally organised (cf. section 5.2 Organisational Form of the
Verification System).
3.3.6Decision-making Procedures, Infrastructure and Logistics
In every nuclear weapon program, a scientific, technical and logistic infrastructure has to
be established. Initially this involves the recruiting and training of specially qualified
personnel and the development of a research and production complex including buildings,
entrances, catering, technical equipment, workshops, maintenance, recruiting department,
acquisition department, housing, management, administration, co-ordination of external
activities and much more. All these activities and facilities must be protected from
verification measures and the risks of detection. The American Manhattan Program, for
example, was hidden in the remote mountain village of Los Alamos.114
The staff of over one thousand and their families had to comply with extremely strict
secrecy terms. Even the postal address consisted solely of a PO box 30 km away in Santa
Fe. External employees and supplementary staff were, with a few exceptions, left in the
dark as to the purpose of the enterprise. Similar extreme secrecy measures were in force in
all other nuclear weapons programs. The bigger a complex grows, the greater is the
probability of detection. In those days, the most likely detection mechanisms were
espionage and treason.
It is to be assumed that a state which wishes to acquire nuclear weapons secretly in a
nuclear weapon free world is likely to be undemocratic and have a pronounced espionage
and intimidation apparatus in place which is useful to it in terms of internal disciplin g.115
It can be assumed that the transparency of political decisions is considerably
underdeveloped. In contrast, decision-making processes in a democracy involve more
protagonists, and it would be hardly possible for a small group to establish a hierarchically-
organised project that requires massive resources, without this becoming known in some
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Wissenschaft, Juli 1997, p. 94.
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in the Rajasthan Desert – A CTB Verification Exercise Using Commercial Satellite Imagery, Science &
Global Security, vol. 6, no. 2, 1997, .pp. 101-188.
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way. It could be objected that the Manhattan Project also took place in a democracy.
However, there is one crucial difference: those involved considered their work to be
necessary and legitimate, and perceived it as a contribution to the rescue of democracy. A
nuclear weapons program in a nuclear weapon free world, however, would be a breach of
international law, a fact which, in a democracy, most participants would be aware of, and
which would be a contradiction in terms of their sense of injustice (cf. section 3.3.8
Secrecy and Creation of legends).
To build up an infrastructure and the logistics for his nuclear weapons program, a beginner
would, in principle, proceed as follows:
1. Decision-making phase: In the first phase, the political decision for a nuclear weapons
program is taken. In this connection, there are many stages. Examples of the different
levels are: - a study on the exploration of the technical possibilities – the provision of
technological possibilities, which keeps an option open, - the manufacture of a few
single warheads or – the manufacture of a strategically important arsenal. A decision-
making process can drag on for years and advance from level to level. It is also
possible that the maximum level, the quickest possible building-up of an arsenal, is
planned from the outset.
2. Preliminary studies: The proliferator will first conduct preliminary studies, including
initial planning, further recruitment and logistics, with a few scientists and actors
whose loyalty he has tested in advance. His secret service and domestic espionage
authorities will be involved from the beginning in order to provide maximum security
from detection.
3. Infrastructure: In the next phase locations will be selected and the infrastructure
constructed. In this respect it is probable that existing facilities will be converted and
used, inasmuch as they are available. Now, at the latest, other specialist and additional
unqualified personnel must be employed, apart from the academics. It will not be
possible to leave all of these people in the dark as to the genuine purpose of the
facilities.
These plans can only be discovered by chance, i.e. by turncoats and secret service methods.
The probability of detection increases in line with the progress of the project.
3.3.7Acquisition Activities116
In order to build up its production industry, the proliferator needs technologies,
components, tools, materials, technical skills, people in authority, training and consultancy
service. The less industrialised the state is, the greater the dependence on foreign help will
be. If he gains no access to a technology, he will try to acquire appropriate production
technology, and if this is not successful, he will procure the production technology for the
production technology. One example is HEU. It is produced by means of, for example
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also section 4.2.3..
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centrifuges. For the production of the centrifuges, machine tools, storage sites, balancing
machines and many other things are required. The further down this chain is tracked, the
more pronounced the dual-use character becomes. Technologies clearly intended for use in
nuclear weapons production are on export check-lists, whereas tools and components
almost always have several uses. The transfer of knowledge and the help of experts also
play an important role.
Typical acquisition activities could be observed in the case of Iraqi proliferation. There are
legal and illegal strategies. This includes the acquisition of goods or components which
were not listed, tools for their own production, the use of middlemen, dummy corporations,
transit through countries with legal loopholes and weak implementation, false declarations
of whereabouts, smuggling, exploitation of diplomatic status, industrial espionage, on-site
consulting of foreign experts and bribery of such experts.
Lessons have been learned from the experience in Iraq which have lead to the
comprehensive reform of export controls in many industrialised countries.117 The aim of
these reforms is primarily to prevent these exports.118 Ano her important function is the
early detection of acquisition activities. How quickly suspicions are aroused on the basis of
acquisition activities depends largely on national export control systems and the level of
international co-operation and transparency. For this reason, there are now international
efforts being made to set up databases on both a national and international level in which
all data regarding suspicious operations and transfer of technology is to be collected.119 In
addition to data from export control authorities, data from customs authorities, police
forces and secret services also plays an important role. The IAEA will also set up a
database of this kind which will collect data from member countries on the import and
export of sensitive goods120 and with the aid of which country profiles are to be
compiled.121 Transferred goods can only be tracked down if all countries participate in the
compilation of information, especially nuclear weapons states, or, in a nuclear weapon free
world, former nuclear weapon states.122 In a nuclear weapon free world, the world-wide
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121Richard Hooper, The System of Strengthened Safeguards, IAEA Bulletin 39/4, December 1997, p. 26.
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monitoring of the transfer of technology and acquisition activities would have to be
systematically implemented.
3.3.8Secrecy and Creation of Legends
One crucial interest of a proliferator is secrecy, which is threatened by international
safeguards, foreign secret services and turncoats. For this reason, all secret nuclear
weapons programs will contain systematic planning designed to deal with this threat. Part
of this will take the shape of counter espionage with its characteristic methods. This
includes the meticulous selection and checking of staff. Furthermore, social and
psychological methods such as indoctrination, intimidation, rewards and honours are
applied in order to guarantee the reliability of employees and to prevent treason.
Another element would be the systematic analysis of existing verification measures and
safeguards and the consistent creation of a legend to conceal the real nature of the
activities. This legend would largely be of a technical nature. In this way, it must for
example be explained how the composition of radioactive samples has originated. The
North Korean violation of the NPT was uncovered not least by inconsistencies between
analysis results and North Korean explanations. Institutions such as existing non-military
research institu es, non-military nuclear energy, conventional military R&D and industrial
facilities all provide potential camouflage (see previous sections). In all cases, technical
alterations and extensions are always required, and personnel will be employed who must
not be informed of the true purpose. Secrecy and security provisions could be justified with
conventional military research and security measures within the nuclear industry. An
important element in the Iraqi program was the systematic analysis of the IAEA safeguards
and the identification of loopholes in existence at the time. The creation of a legend was
also systematic lly conducted and trained.123
The legends must be co-ordinated between all participants and the employees must be
trained in such a way that they too believe as much of it as possible. Practice in dealing
with inspectors are one probable method. In certain aspects, the fact that key employees
will become aware that they are violating national legislation will be unavoidable. This
legislation will exist in a nuclear weapon free world because states will be committed to its
implementation. In a democracy, this violation requires criminal energy. In non-democratic
states, a corresponding sense of injustice could not be expected to the same degree, and
typical social and psychological methods could be more easily applied to persuade also
those people to participate who would lack any mentality of criminal energy in a
democracy with tradition.124
                                                                                                                     
(translation from Chinese), Russian declaration: Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the Special Session of the IAEA Board of Governors, 15 May 1997 (unofficial translation from
Russian).
123Op. cit. (fn 115).
124As an illustration of this argument, we refer to the social mechanisms which led to participation in
institutions such as the Stasi in the former GDR. These would be unimaginable in a country with a
democratic tradition. I  a democracy, the originators of a secret nuclear weapons program would have
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Another element would probably be plans regarding how to react in the case of
international suspicion. Typical scenarios would include denial of access during
inspections, as happened in North Korea and Iraq, delaying tactics by means of protracted
diplomatic negotiations, in order to allow time for the removal of telltale clues (Iraq).
Again, such plans can only be discovered by chance. The more often observations of this
kind are made, the stronger the suspicion becomes. This should then trigger additional,
more intrusive verification methods. One instrument for uncovering such legends could be
interviews with staff at suspicious plants and establishments. In addition, mechanisms
could be implemented which would offer protection to whistle blowers. This protection
could range from legal support in conflicts concerning industrial law, to the creation of an
international relief fund, and typical secret service methods of hiding fleeing informants.
The former is more relevant in democratic states, the latter in states where basic rights are
not observed and where a threat to life and limb exists. These measures should, as far as
possible, be organised on an international level.125
3.4 Summary: How Reliable Can the Early Detection of Secret Nuclear Weapons
Programs Be?
The same applies to the early detection of secret nuclear weapons programs as to the
verification of disarmament (section 3.2). There are two tasks, namely, verification that
declarations are correct and early detection of secret, non-declared activities related to the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Prior to the S3 reform, the IAEA safeguards concentrated
on the former task and neglected the latter. The reform introduced many measures which
strongly increase the chances of early detection.
The validity of declarations can be verified using a number of technological methods
which have been tested and improved over decades. There is no doubt that a theoretically
extremely high degree of accuracy can be achieved. It is, however, limited by financial
restrictions.
Technical methods for the early detection of secret nuclear weapons programs also exist,
for example, long-range measurements of atmospheric radioactivity or measurements from
satellites or aeroplanes. However, they are insufficient by themselves, since there are
various scenarios in which they would be ineffective. The synergy of many additional
measures is necessary, in particular also the involvement of NTM, since this would
increase the probability of detection.
                                                                                                                     
to find people who not only fulfil the very high requirements in terms of scientific and technical
capabilities, but who are also devoid of a sense of injustice.
125The protection of informants and the observation of scientific – technical activities by social groups, e.g.
professional associations, could be taken up in a future nuclear weapons convention. See here: Frank
Blackaby, Societal Verification, in: Background Papers of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996, p. 264.
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The role of satellites must not be underestimated126: with their help, changes in landscapes
can be monitored, for example, buildings, streets or excavations in the case of the
construction of an underground plant. Furthermore, it is possible to detect energy flows, for
example in the case of the operation of an enrichment plant or a reactor. Finally, various
different emissions can also be analysed which occur, for example, as a result of secret
reprocessing or the use of uranium hexafluoride for enrichment. Suspicious plants can also
be monitored in order to determine whether an above-average level of activity is taking
place, for example, traffic and transportation. Mining of uranium can be detected with the
aid of satellites. Satellites also play an important role in the preparation of nuclear tests.
Of crucial importance is the possibility of using all the information in order to establish
suspicion, including that from whistle blowers, secret services or from the free press.
If all the methods of verification mentioned in the previous sections were applied, an
undiscovered program leading to the construction of several warheads would be extremely
improbable.
Which measures would be how important in the synergy depends on a number of different
features: in this respect, it is important to distinguish between beginners and former nuclear
weapon states where documents, experts and materials could still exist, which would make
certain developmental work superfluous. One important difference is the difficulty of
recording initial inventories of former nuclear powers in comparison with all other states,
i.e., of checking whether declarations were correct and complete from the outset, as
described in O. The reason for this is the late implementation and the complexity of the
task. The illegal acquisition scenarios would, however, be the same as in non-nuclear
weapons states. If the declarations given in the disarmament phase were correct, and
sufficient transparency had been gained at the time of their recording, then a later
government will find no more undeclared stockpiles.
Another distinguishing feature is the degree of development in the nuclear industry. The
bigger the industry is, the more expensive is the verification. This is already the case today.
All states with a nuclear industry apart from NWS and India, Pakistan and Israel are
subject to comprehensive IAEA safeguards. A purely mathematical adjustment to the size
of this industry has in the past led to the situation where the majority of activities in terms
of routine inspections were devoted to only a few countries such as Germany, Japan and
Canada. In Iraq, however, inspections took place too infrequently. The reforms therefore
had the aim of not only adjusting the scope of activities to the nuclear industry, but also of
more strongly taking the already grown level of trust between states into consideration.
Other distinguishing features are this trust and the criteria listed on p. 29. It will have to be
accepted that there will always be countries in which not all of these conditions are
fulfilled. On the contrary, it is probable that secret nuclear weapons programs will take
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place in undemocratic and less transparent countries such as, for example Iraq, North
Korea or South Africa prior to its fundamental change. It is precisely in such countries that
early detection must be effective. The following examples are intended  to examine the
historical experiences with these examples with regard to the question how effective the
verification was and whether the programs would have been detected earlier had better
methods been available.
4 Three Examples and Some Lessons to Be Learned
There are a few historical cases of nuclear weapons programs which illustrate the typical
approaches adopted by proliferators and display the possible limitations of verification. In
the following, three examples are analysed in detail. These examples include the nuclear
programs of Iraq, North Korea and South Africa. In the case of South Africa, suspicion had
existed for some time, but could not be confirmed since it was not a member of the NPT
and did not allow comprehensive inspections. The case of South Africa is also of interest,
because a subsequent verification took place here, verifying that nuclear disarmament had
been achieved. In the Iraqi case, verification also took place to establish whether a nuclear
weapons program had been reversed. This case was characterised by, on the one hand, the
extreme rights of access for the inspectors, and on the other hand, (in stark contrast to the
verification of disarmament in South Africa) the total lack of co-operation on the part of
the Iraqis. In North Korea, too, co-operation was lacking, but there was also a lack of
possibilities for forcing access to suspicious plants. It was nevertheless possible to uncover
a violation of the NPT.
All three examples have in common that the protagonists developed secrecy strategies and
that co-operation and transparency were lacking while the programs were being carried
out. The key issue is whether despite this lack of co-operation, early detection would have
been possible. Here it is necessary to examine how the activities were discovered, and how
and with which methods it would have been possible to track them down earlier.
Particularly inspections, secret services and international monitoring of acquisition
activities play an important role here.
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4.1 South Africa: Nuclear Armament and Disarmament127
4.1.1When and How Were the Activities Discovered?
The first suspicious indication was South Africa’s refusal to join the NPT and subject all
its nuclear plants to IAEA safeguards. The CIA had a concrete suspicion that South Africa
was operating a secret nuclear weapon program as early as the mid seventies.128 This
suspicion was largely based on South Africa’s efforts to establish its own capacity for HEU
production. Its intentions became clear in 1977 at the latest when the Soviet secret service,
using surveillance satellites, discovered preparations for a South African nuclear test. The
question now was no longer whether South Africa was working on a nuclear weapons
option, but how advanced this was. In a CIA report of 1984, it was stated that “South
Africa had got together enough HEU for two to four warheads [...] depending on which
design they want to use.“129 "Proof of significant nuclear weapon capability" was
"considerable and compelling"130 Satellite pictures provided an important means of
clarification. In addition, there were "massive efforts on the part of the secret service
community to confirm the occurrence of a nuclear explosion by means other than satellite
surveillance"132s a result of satellite surveillance, it was suspected in 1979 that a nuclear
test had taken place in the South Atlantic. Whether this was really the case, and whether
South Africa and / or Israel were involved, is still a matter of dispute.
Several plants were subjected to IAEA safeguards, but since these were not full-scope
safeguards and, most importantly, did not take place in the uranium-enrichment plants,
existing suspicions could not be further confirmed by these means.
In 1991, as a result of South Africa’s joining the NPT in the same year, the IAEA began
with the implementation of full-scope safeguards and the recording of initial inventories
(see section 4.1.4). Shortly after the commencement of inspections, the suspicion arose in
the IAEA that a secret program must have been carried out. The reason was the large
quantities of  - declared – metallic HEU, since the only possible use for such quantities of
this type of material is the production of nuclear weapons. The IAEA kept its suspicions to
itself since its task is to safeguard the present and future non-military use of the material,
and not to clarify past uses.
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The world was given confirmation when, in March 1993, President de Klerk announced
that South Africa had built up and again disarmed a small nuclear arsenal. Seven warheads
had been planned according to the gun assembly principle, six of which had been
completed and dismantled again. Materials, plants, documentation and tools had been fully
conversed or destroyed. The complete picture emerged following publications by South
African authorities. The scope of the program had been small, it included the construction
of two warheads per year. It ran from 1960 to 1989, the most intensive phase of which
having begun in 1970.
4.1.2Could the Activities Have Been Detected Earlier?
South Africa kept its program extremely secret. Only a few members of the government
had been informed. A total of over 1000 staff had been employed, and their reliability was
thoroughly checked. They were almost all given only partial information, and only five to
ten had a complete overview.131 For the same reason of secrecy, a maximum degree of
self-sufficiency was aimed at in order to minimise the dependency on foreign acquisitions.
This goal was in fact accomplished, despite the embargo.
The technical design that South Africa had selected was the most simple possible, the gun
assembly design. It did not even possess a neutron source, which would have posed a
certain technical hurdle.132 Due to these low technical requirements, the expenditure,
number of employees and other informed persons, and the acquisition measures had all
been kept to a minimum. As late as 1984, the CIA still did not know which design the
South African program was using (see above). Although the secret services seem to have
made considerable efforts, they were not able to gain this information.
However, suspicions were aroused early, by the mid seventies at the latest, i.e. only a few
years after commencement of the more intensive acquisition phase. It was also known that
South Africa was concentrating its efforts on the acquisition of HEU. South Africa had
made no secret of the kind of enrichment technology used since it was also used for non-
military purposes.133 Further clarification was not possible since South Africa had no
further transparency obligations except for a few safeguards in less relevant plants. If it had
been subject to full-scope safeguards at that time, illegal diversion of the quantities
required for the gun assembly design would definitely have been discovered. Today,
following the implementation of S3, an undeclared enrichment plant would also have been
discovered, especially since the suspicion already existed. In the meantime, the IAEA are
allowed to use the latter as a reason for special inspections.
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4.1.3Acquisition Activities as a suspicious indication
Transfer of technology also took place in the South African program. This was mainly
used to gain a technical infrastructure as a precondition for later self-sufficiency and
independence. One of the most important elements was training abroad and the study of
open sources, including declassified documents from the Manhattan Project. South African
nuclear physicists were trained as part of “Atoms for Peace“ in the U.S.. In the fifties and
sixties, the South African non-military nuclear program received massive aid
predominantly from the USA and Europe, for example a research reactor, and for this 100
kg HEU from the USA and reactor technology from Germany, Switzerland and the USA.
An incident has now become known in which South Africa managed to illegally recruit 25
American nuclear technicians.
The South African enrichment technology, the so called “Helikon process“ is related to the
German jet nozzle process. Some sources assume that an intensive transfer of technology
took place here. The technical characteristics are, however, very different, and it is now
generally assumed that there had been little German influence in this matter beyond the
study of published sources.134 It has been proved that an Israeli – South African
technolgy transfer took place regarding other military technologies, but to what extent the
nuclear weapon program was involved is still a matter of dispute. An argument against it is
the fact that, contrary to the South African program, the Israeli program is based on
plutonium, and thus required a completely different ignition technology. A remarkable
event was the purchase of an flash radiography machine from Sweden in 1986 which was
designed in the fifties for the Swedish nuclear weapons program of that time.135Although
this equipment is also employed in the area of conventional military research and
development and also in the non-military area, it is subject to export restrictions, and
acquisition attempts represent a suspicious indication. More transfer of technology took
place in the case of dual-use goods, for example, tools. All tools later found were,
however, technically relatively simple and were not explicitly listed on export check-lists.
The South African Government decided, despite all openness and transparency, not to
name its suppliers and partners, presumably in order to spare them any diplomatic
complications.
The majority of the transfers of technology took place at a time when export controls were
considerably less developed than they are today. Stricter controls were first implemented
with the introduction of the Zangger list on key nuclear technologies in 1974.136 It was
not until 1992, and the experience gained from the attempted proliferation in Iraq, that this
was reformed and a “dual-use appendix“ added to the list.137
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The South African strategy of first establishing a scientific – technological infrastructure
with the aid of transfer of technology and then building up a concrete program as far as
possible without dependency on external aid contributed to a reduction of the detection
probability. The international surveillance of technology transfer is now deliberately used
as an early-warning instrument. Furthermore, legal exports in the nuclear field occur less
and less without comprehensive safeguards. On the other hand, in many countries nuclear
industrialisation is now considerably more advanced, so that the number of countries
which would be heavily reliant on technology transfer is decreasing.
4.1.4Verification of Nuclear Disarmament
The South African example is not only interesting for studying the possibilities of
detecting a proliferator, but also for the verification of nuclear disarmament. South Africa
is the only country in which comprehensive nuclear disarmament has been verified.
The first task of the IAEA was to check the validity of the inventory declarations. 138
There were special problems here: the enrichment plants were not designed for safeguards,
and the IAEA had no experience of the particular enrichment method used in South Africa.
It was therefore necessary to develop the required technical knowledge first. For this
purpose, joint seminars were held for South African specialists and IAEA inspectors. At
first there was a significant discrepancy between the declared amounts and those recorded
independently by the inspectors. Consequently, the production history of the plants was
reconstructed in more detail. Thousands of daily operating protocols and records giving
precise data on the daily state of the plants were then consulted, and the daily production
rate was calculated. In this way, consistency was actually achieved.139
A crucial factor in this success was the co-operation of the South Africans and the extreme
transparency which far exceeded the South African obligations. It was in South Africa’s
own interest to achieve credibility.140
The other task of the IAEA was to check the completeness of the South African
declarations. Once the existence of the former nuclear weapon program was made known,
the objectives were extended: the inspectors were now not only to ensure that all material
was given back and that the information on the production history was complete, but also
to ensure that all non-nuclear components were destroyed, all plants converted or closed
down and the test area destroyed. To this end, the team was reinforced by nuclear weapon
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specialists. It also had the task of discussing future strategies to ensure the irreversibility of
nuclear disarmament with the South Africans.
The inspectors sifted through official documents, records and protocols and carried out
interviews with employees. An important basis was provided by South Africa’s policy of
full transparency. As a result, it could be declared that there was no circumstantial
evidence for and no suspicion of any other, non-declared plants, although the estimations
were “not free of uncertainties“. The IAEA intends to accept South Africa’s future
invitation “to unrestricted access to all locations connected with the nuclear weapon
program, and to all other locations“ also in the future.
Although total certainty can never be achieved, it is by now generally accepted that the
disarmament process was complete. Even with the application of more thorough technical
methods, it would not have been possible to achieve total certainty. The uncompromising
change of the entire South African policy, which contributed to the credibility of the
nuclear disarmament and the gaining of international trust, was of crucial importance,. The
policy of transparency was an important element here. Nevertheless, without the
verification procedure, the new policy alone would not have been sufficient.
There are, however, limitations to the transferability of this example to the much more
advanced task of verification of the disarmament of one of the five established NWS: the
history and scope of the nuclear programs of NWS are considerably more complex, so that
discrepancies must be expected in the reconstruction of the production history. It is
unlikely that these can all be so easily solved as in the case of South Africa, especially if
verification were only to be used following the completion of disarmament. The
disarmament process itself will therefore not be able to be excluded from this process. The
most important issue is how the expected discrepancies are dealt with. In this instance, the
bond of trust established in the meantime will be a crucial factor.
4.2 Iraq: Attempted Violation of the NPT
4.2.1When and How Were the Activities Discovered?
The extent of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was not discovered until spring and
summer of 1991 as a result of inspections by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).141
There had already been several suspicious indications previously. At the end of the 1970s,
it was suspected that Iraq was planning plutonium production. This suspicion was triggered
mainly by the size of a research reactor (Osiraq) and a few cases of transfers of
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technolgy.142 In 1989, the secret services expressed their suspicion of renewed efforts.143
Since 1987, there have been indications of acquisition activities, which hinted at an interest
in centrifugal enrichment and nuclear weapons.144
Iraq was also in the possession of 36 kg of HEU enriched to between 80 and 93%, and  in
part slightly exposed to radiation. This was subject to IAEA safeguards, but the activities
of the IAEA were limited to half-yearly routine inspections in declared plants only. Iraq
had intended to purloin this material in a crash program in 1991, and build a single nuclear
weapon within a few months. According to the last inspection in November 1990, this
material was still intact, with the result that Iraq was certified as complying with NPT
obligations. At the same time there were several suspicious indications that Iraq was
attempting to acquire centrifuge technology. However, this did not lead to any intrusive
consequences, although there were concrete indications on technologies and locations,
acquired mainly by the secret services.145 Th  IAEA was not able to use this kind of
information at that time although, theoretically, it did have the right to carry out special
inspections. But even the secret service assessments of the situation underestimated the
extent of Iraqi activities. If Saddam had not occupied Kuwait, the program would have
continued without hindrance since there had been no other diplomatic consequences.
After the Gulf war, the UN resolution 687 instigated the use of special inspections by
UNSCOM. The IAEA was commissioned with carrying out the nuclear inspections. Due to
the Iraqi status as an occupied country, the inspectors have unparalleled powers and rights
of access which far exceed those of the IAEA in other countries. 146 In Spring, it became
clear that Iraq possessed a significantly more extensive program than had formerly been
supposed. It was concentrated on the production of HEU (cf. section 3.3.1), and except for
plutonium production, also contained all the other elements specified above (sections 3.3.5,
3.3.3 and 3.3.4). At times, it employed several thousand people, including an estimated
several hundred scientists. The previously known attempts to gain access to centrifuge
techniques were confirmed, and its astounding extent was clarified in more detail. But
what came as a surprise was the fact that Iraq had also concentrated on enrichment
technologies in large-scale projects using calutrons (see appendix: A comparison of
enrichment processes). The first important clues in this respect were provided by an Iraqi
turncoat and the analysis of radioactive traces on the clothing of hostages, whom Iraq had
housed close to the plant. The clarification work was characterised by resistance on the
part of the Iraqis who were totally uncooperative and harassed and threatened the
inspectors. They only admitted to information which was either already long proved, or the
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discovery of which was unavoidable anyway.147 On the other hand, the rights and activities
of the inspectors were so extremely intrusive that it was finally possible to convey the firm
conviction that the investigation of the nuclear program could be satisfactorily
concluded.148
The discovery of secret activities was crucially dependent on information from secret
services and other sources, which some states (mainly the USA) had provided. This
included satellite pictures of activities with calutrons and the evaluation of photographic
material by experienced nuclear weapon specialists. Clues were also provided by
statements made by suppliers and export control authorities, which led to an analysis of
technology transfer. In this way, the IAEA collected information from over 182 companies
in 28 countries. Turncoats also played an important role. 149 It was often possible to identify
locations and procedures for more detailed examinations on the basis of their evidence
alone. In addition, expensive measuring equipment was used, for example, to analyse
radioactive radiation from environmental samples.150
4.2.2Could the Activities Have Been Detected Earlier?
Prior to the Gulf war, the extent of the nuclear weapons program was greatly
underestimated and no consequences were drawn from occasional clues and warnings.151
The IAEA had even given the all-clear.152 This was mainly due to the verification task at
that time, which, prior to the S3 reform, was limited to the discovery of illegal diversion
from declared non-military production and did not take into account parallel, undeclared
production. Members were, furthermore, only obliged to declare their plants once they
were loaded with nuclear material, but not during the construction or even development
phases. This is also why the development of Iraqi calutrons remained undetected for so
long. After all, the extent of inspections in a country was determined solely according to
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the scope of its nuclear industry, but not on the basis of the various suspicious
indications.153
The possibilities and activities afterwards are in stark contrast to this.154 There was an
unequivocal aim to uncover all past nuclear-related activities. UNSCOM was able to
operate without diplomatic complications since it was directly answerable to the Security
Council only. Iraq made a number of mistakes since many of its fraudulent intentions and
lies were transparent; and ultimately, UNSCOM had access to every conceivable
technolgy, location and data.
If the IAEA had already carried out special inspections in 1990 on the basis of the
information supplied by secret services and other sources, suspicions would have been
confirmed and specified much earlier. The construction of a centrifugal enrichment plant
would have been discovered. With the current capability of the S3, this would have meant
the opportunity for additional, more precise inspections and inquiries. The compilation of
information from various sources, in particular from secret services, from knowledge about
acquisition activities on international markets and from the results of the special
inspections would have resulted in a clearer picture much earlier.155 It can be assumed that
even in this case Iraq would have done its best to lie and camouflage. If it had nevertheless
succeeded in keeping the production of centrifuges and calutrons secret, further suspicious
indications would have emerged as soon as the enrichment plant was running since such
plants produce heat which can be detected by satellites. If the S3 reform had been
implemented before the Gulf war, several important suspicious indications would have
developed earlier and more precisely. This would have sufficed as trigger for further
special inspections, but we would not have achieved the same degree of precision and
certainty that we now have thanks to the extreme rights of access possible with UNSCOM.
4.2.3Acquisition Activities as Su picious Indication
Iraq was not sufficiently developed to produce all the necessary components and tools
itself without external help. For this reason, it constructed an extensive acquisition network
which was intended to exploit the loop holes in export controls of industrialised
countries.156 These activities concentrated mainly on enrichment technology, but also on
several other components such as electrical detonators. In addition, they carried out
extensive work themselves which, however, depending on the level of technical
complexity, was limited in range. For example, the domestically produced steel for
centrifuges was unsuitable, and imports from Germany and other industrial countries were
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used instead.157 The same applies to a variety of other components, in particular the
centrifuge technology and the tools for its production, which require high quality and
precision. Foreign help was of lesser importance in terms of calutrons, which do not
represent high technology and do not require the latter in production. Before the Gulf war,
it was actually not suspected that Iraq could try to acquire this technology.
The role played by transfer of expertise and the help of experts should not be
underestimated. This applies particularly to the centrifuge project which was essentially
dependent on the advice of foreign experts. At the end of the 1980s, leading Iraqi scientists
took part in international conferences on subjects closely related to the scientific principles
of implosion technology.158 Given careful observation, this could also have provided a
small suspicious indication.
In fact, even before the reforms, which were implemented as a result of the experiences
with Iraq, Iraq’s activities provided the main causes of the first suspicious indications. For
this reason, Iraq attempted to spread its acquisitions as much as possible, and used the full
scope of typical strategies.159
4.3 North Korea: Attempted Violation of the NPT
4.3.1When and How Were the Activities Discovered?
The exact time of the discovery of the North Korean nuclear weapons program is hard to
determine. The suspicion that the country was attempting to develop nuclear weapons
arose as early as the mid 1980s.160 IAEA inspections between May 1992 and March 1993
reinforced the suspicion that a nuclear weapons program existed. A plant declared as a
radiochemical laboratory was in fact a reprocessing plant in construction. The analysis of
plutonium samples which North Korea handed over to the IAEA showed that North Korea
had made false statements regarding its production history. As the result of a tip-off from
the USA, the IAEA stumbled upon two undeclared buildings near Jongbjon which were
believed to contain tell-tale nuclear waste. The USA had developed this suspicion on the
basis of satellite pictures, i.e. NTM. The analysis of this waste could have led to further
conclusions regarding the nuclear activities of North Korea, however, the IAEA were
refused an inspection. On 1st April, the Board of Governors of the IAEA declared North
Korea's non-compliance with the security agreement, and informed the Security Council of
the UN. This did not happen on the grounds of unequivocal evidence of a nuclear weapons
program, but because the agency was unable to rule out the existence of such a program
with any sufficient degree of certainty. To date, no complete inspection of the nuclear
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complex has taken place.161 Contrary to the Iraqi case, the inspectors were unable to find
any written documents on the program, and only rough estimations can be made as to its
level of development. However, due to the circumstantial evidence available, it is an
undisputed fact that a nuclear weapons program did exist.
4.3.2Could the Activities Have Been Detected Earlier?
The North Korean nuclear weapons program was discovered due to the combination of on-
site inspections and data analysis by the IAEA, as well as information from the intelligence
service of a third state. The S3 safeguards reform introduced following the experience with
Iraq had already had an impact on the implementation of inspections. The IAEA controls
were carried out much more thoroughly, even distrustfully. Due to the more accurate
analysis of plutonium samples and on-site measurements there was evidence of the
existence of contradictions in the North Korean declarations. North Korea had claimed to
have first separated plutonium in 1990, but the analyses showed that such activities had
taken place much earlier.162 However, had the North Koreans told the truth about the time-
span of their production history, an important suspicious indication would not have
materialised.163
The first use of information from intelligence services in the history of the IAEA was of
great importance for reinforcing the initial suspicion. They supplied information regarding
the presumed location of non-declared, telltale material, and thus facilitated the first
concrete demands for special inspections. These demands, although already part of the
rights of the agency, were also claimed for the first time.
Even without the use of these new measures, initial suspicions would still have been
aroused, because of the false information given by the North Koreans regarding their
reprocessing history which would also have been detected with the aid of traditional
measures. But it is debatable whether the IAEA would also have carried out such precise
on-site measurements at that time.164 Before the reform however, information from
intelligence services would not have been used, and thus, it would not have been so easy to
be more precise about the initial suspicion. If, in addition, the North Koreans had made
more consistent statements, no substantial, and, above all, no legally usable initial
suspicion would have arisen without the use of information from NTM.
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It is not clear whether the nuclear weapons program could have been identified so rapidly
without the use of the new measures. At least the false declarations regarding the
reprocessing plants would have been recognised immediately, even prior to the reform.
The main obstacle in terms of early detection was initially the lack of adequate authority
on the part of the IAEA to actually apply the safeguards.165 North Korea has been a
member of the NPT since 1985. According to the text of the treaty, it was committed to
finalising a safeguards agreement with the IAEA within eighteen months after entering the
treaty. North Korea did not meet this deadline. It did not sign the agreement until January
1992, with the effect that the first inspections could not be carried out until May of that
year. Even state of the art technologies and procedures can have no impact if basic
contractual commitments are not complied with. The special inspection has, to date, not
been carried out, either. More precise details of the North Korean activities are therefore
not known, but it is not the task of a verification agency to enforce inspections.
4.3.3Acquisition Activities as Suspicious Indication
The foundation stone of the North Korean nuclear program was laid in the 1960s by means
of imports from the then USSR, and its initial aim was peaceful utilisation of nuclear
energy. A 5-MW reactor was completed in 1986 in domestic production. North Korea did
not need to import fuel for this gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor since it was
operated with natural uranium, and the country had its own resources of uranium and
graphite.166 This meant that the acquisition of enrichment technology was not an issue.
North Korea tried as far as possible to become independent of imports. However, due to an
insufficient level of technological development, it was unable to achieve this goal. It
obtained parts of its nuclear technology from socialist countries, and it can be assumed that
North Korea did not manage entirely without western technology. Some sources conjecture
that western companies often used the former GDR and Rumania as a channel for
deliveries to North Korea.167 This data is, however, often imprecise, and its reliability
cannot be assured. In contrast, there is more concrete information available on “dual-use“
exports from Federal German companies in the 1980s. The goods were obviously shifted to
North Korea via the former GDR or India and Pakistan.168
In North Korea too, the transfer of knowledge and assistance from experts played a
significant role. North Korean scientists were educated in the area of nuclear physics in the
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1950s and 1960s in the USSR and China.169 Once this foundation of knowledge was laid,
North Korea carried out its own research, and built up its own team of scientists, engineers
and technicians. The capabilities of this team were sufficient to rearm a small research
reactor. A larger nuclear reactor was completed in 1986, probably largely without Soviet
help. The primitive design of this reactor was equivalent to the state of technology typical
of the 1940s and 1950s. All indications suggest that this reactor is a copy of the first British
reactor, the Calder Hall Magnox reactor of 1956, which leads to the conclusion that the
North Korean engineers had used the declassified design information on this reactor
type.170
In the mid 1980s, North Korea obtained the know-how to fuse uranium, and possibly also
for its enrichment. This information is supposed to have originated in German companies,
and made its way illegally to North Korea via Switzerland and Pakistan. However, this
information obviously found no application in the military nuclear program, which was
based on plutonium.171
Finally, according to South Korean press reports, North Korean scientists were allowed to
take part in Chinese nuclear tests in the 1960s, although it is not clear, to what extent China
allowed their then allies to share its nuclear weapon technology. In addition, the reliability
of the source should not be overestimated.172
Better export controls would most probably have been able to prevent a major part of the
illegal exports. For this, an increased inclusion of “dual-use“ goods as well as better end
use controls would have been necessary. On the basis of the information known, however,
it has to be assumed that improved controls would only have contributed minimally to the
delaying of the North Korean nuclear weapons program or its earlier detection. Those
deliveries from Federal German companies (zirconium and special furnaces) were not of
great significance for the plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, and the supply of the
relevant basic technology from the 1960s was no secret.
5 On the Road to Verification
5.1 Possibilities and Limitations
5.1.1Two components: NTM and Implemented Verification Methods
There are a great many different kinds of verification methods. They range from
objectifiable and potentially automated measurements, to organisational methods, and
subjective judgements based on ambiguous suspicious indications. The measures which are
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discussed in this report include global and local measurements of environmental
radioactivity, satelli  surveillance on various frequencies, specialised on-site
measurements or the sealing of objects and measuring devices, routine and challenge
inspections – which can include measuring, surveillance and interviews, the use of
verification apparatuses from other treaties, in particular the CTBT,173 the methods used by
national authorities, such as the police force and customs, for the detection of criminal
transfer activities, reporting commitments and transparency measures on the part of
member states (in a nuclear weapon free world, all states), international monitoring of the
transfer of technology and scientific communities, the use of secret service information and
random information from turncoats, and, not least, collection, comparison and
interpretation of all this information. Extensive coverage, a high detection probability and
the possibility of localisation or refutation of initial suspicions can only be assured by
means of a synergy of different methods. Each method by itself is not sufficient.
An indispensable element in any verification system is the highest possible degree of
probability that activities can be detected, in other words, the use of secret service
information and corresponding secret service activities. This applies equally to the
verification of the complete destruction of all warheads and to the additional early
detection of secret rearmament. As also discussed in the previous sections, secret service
measures, turncoats or random discovery by chance for the purposes of detection are
important elements for almost all activities such as, for example, the hiding of warheads or
the secret recruiting of scientists for a development program.
Although the element of NTM has initially proved controversial in negotiations, it is
increasingly becoming a vital part of international treaties, as for example in the CBTB.
This element has also been introduced into the S3 by the possibility of using “all
information“, not least due to the experience in Iraq, whose proliferation attempt would
have been uncovered earlier if the IAEA had been able to use and apply this possibility.
NTM also played a crucial role in the establishing of suspicion against North Korea. In the
case of South Africa, secret service activities alone would did not suffice to confirm a
general suspicion. Had more inspections been carried out, the South Africans would not
have succeeded in keeping the program secret.
NTM encompass more than just secret services. It is used as a collective term for all
activities which are not regulated by an international organisation. This can include the use
of satellites or measurements from aircraft. Uranium mining, energy and gas releases
caused by the operation of enrichment plants, and nuclear reactors or reprocessing plants
can be detected with the aid of satellites.174 There will always also be satellites which states
use only for their own military purposes. The utilisation of pictures from these satellites
then counts as NTM. Efforts should, however, be made to organise as many as possible of
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these activities on an international level. Thus it would be conceivable, although relatively
expensive, that a verification authority would operate satellites itself. One variation of this
would be the use of commercial satellite pictures and measurements. The opportunities
provided by satellite verification depend largely on their technical equipment.
One problem with NTM is the possibility of misuse, which always has been and always
will be a cause of conflict during negotiations and in their application. Here too, there are
both unjustified and justified accusations (see section 5.2 Organisational Form of the
Verification System).
Most methods reach their limits as soon as a state refuses to co-operate and co-operation
cannot be enforced. Although the North Korean intentions could be uncovered, a more
accurate production history could not be reconstructed since North Korea refuses to allow
special inspections of different plants. Iraq is also uncooperative, but in this case, special
inspections were enforced and the history of its activities could largely be clarified and
reversed.175 In contrast, the completeness of South Africa’s nuclear disarmament could be
established with a high degree of credibility. The crucial factor was South Africa’s
readiness to co-operate, which meant that a high degree of transparency was possible.
In the long term, global co-operation and transparency are the crucial prerequisites for the
verification of both nuclear disarmament and a nuclear-weapon-free world. NTM and the
collecting of information and data on an international level also function without the co-
operation of the states concerned, but, as the example of South Africa shows, they do have
their limitations. As soon as suspicion is aroused, verification measures must be used also
in the country itself. It must be possible to clear up or clarify a suspicion. In the case of
states such as Iraq or South Africa refusing to co-operate, mechanisms must exist to
compel compliance. As was the case in North Korea, it must at least be possible to prevent
the continuation of a nuclear weapons program for an interim period of time, prior to final
clarification.
5.1.2Secrecy versus Transparency
The principle of maximum transparency is a prerequisite for the acceptance of the
verification results. This applies both to disarmament and to further verification of absence
of nuclear weapons. Especially where the verification of the dismantling of warheads is
concerned, there is the principle problem of the contradiction between the disclosure of
technical details and their being kept secret. To make this contradictory connection
between secrecy and verification possibilities clear, a few concrete examples are given in
the following table. In the first column, several examples of sensitive information are
listed, the disclosure of which could be controversial. In the second column, verification
activities are given, which would reveal the information. The third column gives the source
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and the state from which the example is taken. The last column shows how this disclosure
is judged by the state, or the point at which no more importance is attached to its secrecy.
Secrecy has several reasons:
1. The disclosure of technical details poses consequent dangers for non-proliferation and
could conflict with the commitments of nuclear-weapon states, in the sense of Art. 1
NPT.
2. The level of the technological development of a state should not be revealed to the
other side. Here the motive can be to hide technological weaknesses, or an interest in
protecting technological superiority.
3. Secrecy traditionally has a special status in the nuclear complexes of nuclear weapon
states. The divulgence of technical information is seen as being on a par with the
surrender of status, and is often viewed as defeat.
Especially the first two reasons must be taken into account in the construction of
verification and transparency measures. The third might become void with time, especially
if suitable political measures are put in place. However, continuous resistance from
scientific and military circles in nuclear weapons research, development, production and
maintenance must be expected over a long period. Clear variations in the degree of secrecy
can be observed in all nuclear weapon states, which can largely be explained in terms of
such traditions. The highest degree of openness and effort can be observed in the USA. At
the end of 1993, as part of the policy of “openness“, the American Department of Energy
(DoE) began an initiative aimed at the reform of transparency in government. To this end,
various advisory panels investigated the principles on which secrecy and disclosure were
based.176 At the end of June 1998, a new directive on classification came into force
incorporating the results of these advisory panels.177 The aim is to give the public the
opportunity for assessments, especially in the areas of environment, accident safety, health
and basic science.178 However, information which, if disclosed, could endanger “national
security“ is to remain secret. This classification should be carried out according to
comprehensible and transparent rules. Misuse of the secrecy regulations for reasons of
competition or the covering up of crime or failure is not permissible (§1045.13
Classification Prohibitions). The criteria for decisions on secrecy also in the future can be
summarised as follows (§1045.16):
· Previously disclosed information is not to be classified as secret.
                                         
176U.S. Department of Energy, Openness Advisory Panel, Responsible Openness: An Imperative for the
Department of Energy, August 25, 1997; Albert Narath (Chair), Report of the Fundamental
Classification Policy Review Group, Unclassified Version, Issued by the Department of Energy,
October 1997, in the Internet at: http://www.doe.gov/html/osti/opennet/repfcprg.html.
177Department of energy, Office of the Secretary, 10 CFR Part 1045, RIN 1901-AA21, Nuclear
Classification and Declassification, Action (Final Rule), Effective Date: June 29, 1998.
178This policy is also aimed at strengthening the "Freedom of Information Act". This is a law giving
citizens the right to receive all information from the government, except that which is expressly
classified as secret.
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· Military countermeasures and defence against U.S. weapons systems are not to be
facilitated.
· The dangers of proliferation are to be minimised.
· U.S. foreign policy is not to be endangered.
· Public welfare, open and informed discussions and economic growth are to be
promoted.
· The public acceptance of a program is to be promoted, and its costs minimised.
As a result of this reform, a large amount of technical information on nuclear warheads has
actually been declassified in the USA, since, in line with the foregoing criteria, it was
regarded as no longer posing a threat to non-proliferation, and there was no danger of an
undesirable disclosure of  America’s own technological state of development.179
The striving for objectivity and the suppression of the motivation for secrecy for subjective
reasons, e.g. reasons of status, becomes clear. The suggested procedures aim at
establishing the most logical, deducible path from the principle of “national security“ to a
concrete regulation. This leads to recommendations such as, for example: "A weapon type,
once retirement is authorized and dismantlement completed, is not a factor in military
capabilities, and all information concerning production and dismantlement rates and
schedules for this weapon type can be declassified."180 Such transparency is, indeed,
helpful in the verifying of nuclear material stocks, but would need to be extended on a
long-term basis. It has, for example, been recommended to declassify inventory figures.
Nevertheless, these still have not been released as part of the reforms. Inventory figures
are, however, a minimum requirement for long-term disarmament plans. Production
histories, current activities and the transfer between the authorities relevant for them, DoE
and DoD, are also classified as "information of national security". It is, of course,
impossible to fully objectify such classifications since, in the long run, they will always be
subjective in nature and dependent on political factors such as international mutual trust.
For this reason, it is an even more urgent requirement that the future process of
declassification will continue to be adapted to the political situation.
In the report, for example, the continued existence of American nuclear weapons is not
questioned. This alone is not an obstacle for the next round of nuclear reductions. In the
wake of more extensive and total nuclear disarmament however, the term “national
security“ would be re-defined, which would have an impact on the principles specified
above. It is for example conceivable that the principle of prevention of countermeasures
against U.S. nuclear weapons (above list, b) would cease to apply. On the other hand, the
principle of the minimisation of the proliferation dangers will always have to be retained,
especially in a nuclear weapon free world. What must also be taken into consideration is
                                         
179U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy —
Restricted Data Declassification Policy 1946 to the Present (RDD-4), January 1, 1998. This document
lists over a hundred pages of technical details which are now declassified.
180Report of the Fundamental Classification Policy Review Group, op. cit. (fn 176), chapter 6.
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Table 2: Examples of information which could be disclosed by means of verification
Information Verification Activity Country, Source Evaluation and
Classification
Fact that a warhead is boosted.Examination of the pit
container
USA: Now
Use of Pu of the a-Phase Observation of the drilling
and cutting of the metal
Field test FT-34 known
Design of the "" warhead Inspection of X-ray pictures(ACDA), USA 1969,
fn. 183
Still classified
Radar frequency of the MK 28 now
Use of Pu-239 and U-235 in hypoth.
model warheads
Evaluation of g spectrum China: Intolerable
Pu-239 interior, U-235 exterior,
small amounts of either Th-232 or
U-232
100-3000 keV Institute of Appl. Physics &
Math., Beijing, 1995
fn. 37
Use of Be in warhead design Evaluation of g spectrum Declassified Nov.
93
Pu and U can form compoundsSample analysis Declassified Feb.
93
Hypoth. critical mass, e.g. 4 kgnone USA: Declassified Jan.
94
Average mass of the U.S. warheadsCounting of warheads +





External dimensions and weight of
neutron generators
Measurement, weighing Policy, fn. 179 Declassified Feb.
93
U, HEU, and other nuclear materials
can be present in secondaries
n-, g pectroscopy Declassified Feb.
93





Materials for tampers in specified
weapons
Inspection of the result of the
dismantling of a specific
weapon
USA:
Draft Public Guidelines Classified
U-233, U-235, U-238, Pu-239, Li-6,




to DoE Classification of
Information, January 1998, 181 Declassified
Fissile material for specific
warheads
Inspection of the result of the
dismantling of a specific
weapon
Classified
Pu isotope vector of unspecific
Russian warheads
Safeguards, disarmment Pu
before mixing with non-
military Pu
Russia: study
 Siemens/Minatom on MOX-
pilot plant, Feb. 1997, fn. 47
Classified
Number of nuclear warheads USA,
Ru, Chi, GB, F
Declarations (no verification) All NWS: Dipl. Reactions to
1993 Kinkel proposal, Müller, fn.
31; Classification Guidelines (fn.
181)
Classified
                                         
181Department of Energy, Office of Declassification, Draft Public Guidelines to Department of Energy
Classification of Information, June 27, 1994.
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that a generally accessible publication could pose a much greater danger of proliferation
than confidential treatment of the same information by a few selected employees of an
international authority.
The striving for objectivity and transparency of secrecy regulations on nuclear weapons
could take place at an international as well as a purely national level. It is conceivable that
common principles and standards for national laws and procedures could be worked out in
international negotiations. In this respect there are many variations as to when individual
states could participate. One of these principles should be the simplification of verification
tasks and maximum possible transparency.
The transparency in the USA is by far the greatest when compared with the other nuclear
weapon states, in which the status considerations of military–nuclear complexes have a
great influence on the decision-making process.182
Despite secrecy, it is possible to work out technical compromises. In this instance, the
larger the number of technical details which can be disclosed, the more convincing the
verification will be. However, the lower this figure is, the higher will be the acceptance of
the nuclear weapons states concerned. In  1969, the U.S. American Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) carried out an experiment into the relationship between the
amount of disclosed information and the probability of fraud.183 The results of this
experiment showed that, even then, satisfactory compromises could be found.
Although the developments to date are to be seen as positive, it is apparent that no
additional international participation appears to be under consideration apart from of
bilateral co-operation in the area of transparency, at least not in terms of the dismantling
process. Attitudes might change here due to the following reasons: other kinds of
disarmament are being internationally verified, other partial problems of nuclear
disarmament are to become more transparent for the international community, as is also
clear from the negotiations with the IAEA, among others, on the verification of weapons
materials,184 other states could share in the financing, and finally, for political reasons, it is
advisable to demonstrate nuclear disarmament convincingly, not least in order to trigger
measures for nuclear non-proliferation. Moreover, international commitments and
transparency increase the irrevers bility of the measures.
Although non-nuclear weapons states already provide an incomparably higher degree of
transparency with regard to their nuclear activities, and although the need to catch up rests
with the nuclear weapon states, a further rethink is also needed in non-nuclear weapon
                                         
182Russia, for example, is not prepared to disclose the isotope composition of its weapons plutonium,
which also poses problems for the international co-operation on non-military applications. In
comparison, in the USA, the isotope composition is only classified as long as the material is still in the
form of warhead components. As soon as this is modified, the isotope composition can be disclosed.
See: J.T. Markin/W.D. Stanbro, Policy and Technical Issues for International Safeguards in Nuclear
Weapon States, in: International Nuclear Safeguards 1994, Proceedings of a Symposium, Vienna, 14-18
March 1994, vol. II, p. 639.
183United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Final Report – Volume I: Field Test FT-34.
Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (U), January 1969. Declassified1990.
184cf. section 3.1.5 , and op. cit. (fn 53).
65
states in order to speed up this process. For instance, the example of the American attempt
to objectify the decision-making process relating to secrecy and disclosure is an example
which should be copied in Germany. Also, a law such as the Freedom of Information Act
should provide an example for other countries.178
5.1.3Subjectivity for More Flexibility and  Effectiveness?
Prior to and during the negotiations for the S3, a discussion took place which will also play
a role in the verification of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It had been criticised that too
formal rules for the implementation of verification activities resulted in an ineffective
distribution of work. Prior to the reforms, most of the IAEA inspections took place in
industrialised non-nuclear weapon states where no suspicion existed, including Japan,
Canada and Germany, instead of in Iraq, where more extensive controls would have made
more sense. S3  therefore greatly increased the possibilities of carrying out special
inspections and thus introduced greater flexibility. The recurring issue now is which
criteria should be used for the decision as to where verification activities are to be
concentrated. in the course of the discussions on such criteria, an employee of the IAEA
suggested that “in carrying out its verification mandate, the Agency can only take into
consideration the willingness of its partners to demonstrate transparency in their relevant
nuclear activities.“185 This wording could be used as a starting point for the development of
differentiating criteria for the distribution of verification activities.
The problem which arises here, however, is that subjective judgements are thus
reintroduced. Interpretations as to what counts as “willingness to show transparency“ can
vary over a vast spectrum, and additionally, the danger of misuse is present. For example,
an inspected state interested in protecting industrial secrets could be threatened with a “bad
report“ by an authority interested in enforcing more transparency. In contrast, the volume
of verifcation work would be much greater and less effective, if more objective, i.e.
rationally more comprehensible, less conflict-loaded criteria were used. Adequate conflict-
solving strategies prove crucial in this connection (cf. next section 5.2 Organisational Form
of the Verification System).
5.2 Organisational Form of the Verification System
The successful implementation of verification measures depends not least also on the
organisational form of the verification system and must therefore be meticulously thought
out.
The currently existing agreements on nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation give a first impression of the possible tasks and organisational structure of
verification. Treaties such as the Sea Bed Treaty (1971) and the ABM Treaty (1972) are
solely verified by NTM. Within the framework of the INF Treaty (1987) and the START
                                         
185Bruno Pellaud, Safeguards: The evolving picture, IAEA Bulletin 38/4, December 1996, unofficial
translation, author’s italics.
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Treaties (1991 / 1993), in which nuclear weapons were disposed of or reduced for the first
time, compliance with upper limits and the destruction of surplus weapons must be
verified. They have essentially more extensive systems of rules which are based on the co-
operation of the states party to the treaty, and include routine on-site inspections as well as
inspections at very short notice. The verification of the NPT is no longer the task of the
nation-states, but of an international agency. The IAEA verifies the entire fuel cycle in the
member states.186 Internationally staffed teams of inspectors have access to a great number
of nuclear technology plants. Following the reform of the safeguards system in the mid
1990s, rights of access were extended, the information sources of the agency stretched, and
nuclear-weapon states incorporated to a limited extent in the verification procedure. With
the entry into force of the Test Ban Treaty, another organisation, the CTBTO, will be
established, which will supplement the existing structures.
The verification of comprehensive nuclear disarmament will build on this widely-ramified
system of instruments. Since, during the course of the disarmament process, its area of
responsibility will extend beyond the scope of the present agreements, its technical and
organisational structures will have to be further developed.
Challenge inspections
The procedure for the triggering and implementing of challenge inspections can be crucial
for the effectiveness of the verification regime. If the enforcement of such inspections is
very difficult and protracted, important information can go missing. On the other hand,
challenge inspections that are carried out without sufficient reason can aggravate the
political climate between treaty states and severely shake the trust in the regime. Rules
must therefore be created which avoid politically motivated accusations and selective
treatment, but also effectively prevent a blockade of inspections. Thus the crucial issue is
who can trigger a challenge inspection and under what circumstances.
One possibility is to transfer the competence to the secretariat, i.e. the technical wing of an
inspection agency. It could thus use its own data in the evaluation of a situation, and
subject possible information from member states to an examination. The reaction speed is
in this case relatively high, and “character assassination“ actions could largely be avoided.
However, such a ruling brings with it the risk of politicisation of the organisation. Any
decision in favour of a challenge inspection is politically explosive. It will often meet with
resistance or at least criticism from the state concerned. If the secretariat is the initiator of
the inspections, it will become the butt of criticism even if the decision-makers had acted
to the best of their knowledge and belief. The risk is that the neutral status of the secretariat
might be lost. This is exactly what happened in 1993 in the case of North Korea, when the
Director General of the IAEA wanted to order challenge inspections due to discrepancies
between the national declarations and the findings of the regular inspections. North Korea
accused the IAEA of having abandoned its neutral standpoint and even went so far as to
charge  it with espionage on behalf of the USA. The accusation was, in this case, obviously
                                         
186 With the exception of the nuclear weapons states, which ar  only controlled on a voluntary basis.
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fully unfounded. Nevertheless, the reputation of an organisation can be damaged in the
wake of such a conflict.187
It is therefore better if the challenge inspections are agreed by the member states. The
secretariat can, in its role as provider of information, still considerably influence the
decision without itself deciding on the execution. The so-called “red light“ process ought
to be used in order to reach a decision. This means that in principle all challenge
inspections are to be carried out, unless a certain majority of the states explicitly speak out
against the inspection. If a vote (at best within a fixed time limit) is not explicitly
requested, the inspection is carried out without further discussion.188
There should be absolutely no possibility for formally approved challenge inspections to be
rejected. If a state refuses nevertheless to allow the inspections to take place, effective
sanction mechanisms must be put into motion. The enforcement of special inspections,
possibly even with the use of armed forces, is, however, a tricky matter. On one hand,
enforcement is unavoidable if the verification regime is to have maximum effectiveness.
On the other hand, the use of force cannot be applied by any random organisation. It
should not be too large, so that a decision can be reached quickly. It must, however, be
representative of the community of states. From today’s perspective, the Security Council
would be appropriate, though it would not be able to satisfactorily fulfil this task in its
present form. The composition of the group of permanent members would have to be
changed. It should no longer consist only of the official nuclear weapon states.
Furthermore, it should not be able to veto decisions on special inspections. In short, a
reform of the United Nations is necessary which would weaken the current permanent
members of the Security Council. Due to the existing rules on amendments, such a change
would require a firm determination to carry out reforms.
The Internationalisation of Verification
The verification of total nuclear disarmament should, in the long term, not remain with the
nation-states. The take-over by an international authority is unavoidable. The reliability of
the verification should not depend on the willingness of individual states to provide
information or technology. An international organisation with its own technical staff and
its own verification instruments is the best guarantee for the reliable and even application
of the necessary verification measures, and would strengthen the trust in the verification
process.189
An important example of the internationalisation of verification is satellite surveillance. At
present, only a small number of states have access to satellite pictures. In a nuclear weapon
                                         
187See Patricia Lewis: Organizing for Effective Implementation, in: Eric Amett (ed.), Implementing the
Comprehensive Testban, SIPRI Report no. 8, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1994, pp. 86-102.
188 Using the so called “green light“ process, the inspection only takes place when a certain majority
explicitly pronounces in its favour. This process makes the implementation of challenge inspections
more difficult since the approval of the responsible body is always required. Usually, this results at least
in a delay.
189See Heinz Gmelch, Verifikation von multi- and internationalen Rüstungskontrollabkommen, Baden-
Baden (Nomos), 1993, pp. 227-288.
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free world, this is not sufficient. An organisation responsible for verification must have
unhindered access to satellite data. It must have practically unlimited rights of use of
satellite(s). An internationalisation of the regulations of the Open Skies Treaty is also
conceivable. In this case, the verification organisation would have its own aircrafts and
sensor technology with which it could verify the territory of member states.
Furthermore, it must be decided whether the various verification tasks in the nuclear area
could be integrated into one “super organisation“. The advantage of a large organisation
responsible for the whole range of nuclear verification tasks is, for example, that only one
administrative apparatus would have to be built up, and, if desired, only one General
Assembly of member states and only one Executive Council. This way, the verification
machinery could, perhaps, be organised more cost-effectively. Laboratories and databases
could be managed jointly. This would save costs and facilitate data exchange (for example
also due to the compatibility of the records). Duplicated inspections or duplicated
acquisition of verification devices could be avoided. A very large organisation does,
however, also have its drawbacks. The political decision-making bodies (General
Assembly and Executive Council) face a larger and increasingly complex structure of
tasks. The requirements in terms of technological understanding rise, the political contexts
they must master become more complex. A larger administration apparatus can, to a
certain extent, reduce the duplication of tasks; however, experience shows that with the
growth of an organisation, more levels of administration are introduced. This complicates
and slows down the communicatio  between the upper and lower levels. The relationship
between the technical staff and the political decision-making level becomes more difficult.
The recourse to several organisatio s seems more promising since it allows the verification
process to be flexibly adapted to the immediate disarmament steps. More realistic and, at
the same time, more sensible, however, is the concept of  a network of individual
organisations. The establishment of a joint co-ordinating body can reduce the duplication
of tasks. The shared use of technological resources (laboratories, computers, means of
transportation...) can nevertheless take place. The establishment and use of shared
databases can also be arranged by means of such a co-ordinating body.190 Whatever the
decision, each participating organisation must be directly connected to the (reformed)
Security Council. Information on possible treaty violations must be passed on to the
council without diversion. This means that the leader of each verification department must
have direct access to the Security Council.
The IAEA already possesses the expertise and the technical equipment needed to fulfil
most future verification tasks. It verifies the fuel cycle of almost all non-nuclear weapon
states, and could carry out this task equally well in the case of nuclear weapon states and
threshold states. To this end, the quantitative build up of resources (for example in terms of
staff, laboratories and verification instruments) is first necessary. The IAEA is also capable
of verifying a future FMCT. It should therefore provide the starting point for the
development of the ultimate organisational form for the verification. That means that it
                                         
190See Marvin Miller, Verification Arrangements, in: Backgroundpapers of the Canberra Commission,
1996, pp. 181-189..
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must not only be expanded in terms of size, but that it must undergo changes in terms of
status, competence and its relationship to the Security Council.
The IAEA cannot take on all verification tasks. The CTBTO should continue to be
entrusted with the verification of the Test Ban Treaty. For the verification of the
destruction of warheads, carrier systems and the infrastructure of military nuclear
programs, a third organisation, working in close co-operation with the IAEA, will probably
have to be formed. The work of this organisation would, however, only be transitional
since the objects of its verification will be dismantled after completion of the disarmament
process.
Co-operation with Other Verification Organisations
The reliability of the verification system can be substantially increased by means of co-
operation with verification organisations from other areas of non-nuclear arms control.
This co-operation between various organisations, for example, from the nuclear and
chemical sectors is not as yet possible. The OPCW is, for example, strictly prohibited from
passing on findings. The organisation is practically subject to an information ban. If it were
to come across information which was, for example, of relevance to the IAEA, it would not
be able to pass on this information. The possibility of data exchange must therefore be
incorporated in all arms control treaties and the corresponding statutes covering
verification organisations.
“Social Verification“
In addition to the classical technical instruments of verification, the concept of social
verification has been developed. This is a control system which, in contrast to traditional
verification concepts, relies on the participation of the entire population of a country and is
not confined to highly-specialised, technically  well-equipped teams of experts. Social
verification is to be carried out by the population of a country. In principle, every citizen is
encouraged to pass on all information on treaty violation or attempted treaty violation
which comes to his/her attention to a competent international authority. This passing on of
information is intended not only as the right, but also as the duty of every citizen and
would therefore have to be incorporated in the legislature of the states. The passing on of
information must, therefore, not be treatable as a punishable offence in the countries
concerned, either as treason or any other crime. This concept of involving the whole
population is also know as “Citizens Reporting“.191 In practice, such whistle blowers will
often be people who come to know of secret projects in one way or another due to their
training (engineers, specialists, scientists). It must be made possible for such informants to
disclose their knowledge without incurring any risks. Thus, for example, an international
fund could be set up for the support of such whistle blowers.
Universality
                                         
191For a thorough discussion, see Joseph Rotblat: Societal Verification, in: Joseph Rotblat/Jack
Steinberger/Bhalchandra Udgaonkar (eds.), A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Desirable? Feasible?,
Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford, 1993, pp.  103-118.
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The process of comprehensive nuclear disarmament can be initiated by a relatively small
number of states. At the end of the process, however, all states must have committed
themselves to relinquishing nuclear weapons. The system can only offer the high degree of
security expected of it if all states are part of the system, and only then can sanctions
against transgressors take effect.
5.3 Conclusions
This report has attempted to approach the answer to the question: “Is a nuclear weapon free
world verifiable?“. It has become clear that this is a complex task. Many different methods
of verification have to mutually supplement and support each other. No single method
could manage to fulfil the task alone since many circumstantial evidences taken for
themselves prove ambivalent. Various methods of verification take on various degrees of
importance according to whether former nuclear weapon states are concerned or not, how
extensive the non-military nuclear industry is, how industrialised the state is, how high the
degree of transparency is, and to what extent the state co-operates with the verification
authorities.
The synergy of the most vastly differing methods is thus a decisive factor. Together they
can trigger suspicious indications early and with a high degree of probability, and they can
provide the relevant evidence. There are many possible variations on how to implement
and apply measures. It is not necessary to select the most complex and expensive variation
for each technology and each process; the crucial factor is a high degree of probability of
detection. How high this has to be depends largely on political factors, in particular on the
degree of trust bestowed on the inspected state. There will always be many and extensive
variations on which states are trusted, and to what degree. The extreme case is the
establishing of concrete suspicion and the necessity for clarification. The other extreme
case is that of a state which no one mistrusts. Here, the prerequisites are a maximum
degree of transparency  and readiness to co-operate on the part of the state concerned. The
degree of transparency and readiness to co-operate must itself contribute to the
reinforcement or refutation of a suspicion.
A one hundred percent successful verification will never be achieved. However, the
number of possibilities for starting and bringing to completion an undetected nuclear
weapons program could hover around zero, if the implemented verification measures
become more and more extensive and intrusive. It has also become clear, that the political
background against which verification is to take place must develop considerably. On one
hand, the detection of a secret rearmament program must be possible early enough and
with a high degree of probability; on the other hand, this must also be recognised by the
international community.
Three case studies – Iraq, North Korea and South Africa – have demonstrated three of the
most critical problems of a future verification regime:
1. The early detection of secret nuclear weapons programs (Iraq and North Korea).
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2. The complete recording of stocks of nuclear weapons and their components (South
Africa).
3. The enforcing of inspections in the case of uncooperative states (Iraq and North
Korea).
Especially in the case of the IAEA, the technical instruments of verification and the
competence, that is, the remit of the protagonists have been enormously improved and
extended in the last few years in response to the cases of Iraq and North Korea. The
improvements made to date, above all the S3 reform, are not sufficient to accompany the
nuclear disarmament process to its conclusion, but they represent an important step
towards the solution of the first problem, the early detection of secret programs.
The complete recording of stocks of nuclear weapons and their components (the second
problem given above) is not a technical problem. The critical points are transparency and
readiness to co-operate on the part of nuclear states and threshold states. The problem of
the secrecy of militarily relevant details can be solved with the aid of cleverly-devised
verification methods. It is important that transparency measures are taken as early as
possible and that the rejection of information requests is largely stopped.
The main problem which will arise in future is the enforcement of inspections in
uncooperative states. It is unlikely that the instruments necessary for this, especially the
reform of the Security Council, will be implemented in the foreseeable future. But since
the elements of a nuclear disarmament process – the development of technical verification
measures, transparency, readiness to co-operate, and confidence-building – reinforce each
other, the enforcing of inspections does not represent an insurmountable problem in the
long term.
The following prerequisites are indispensable:
· The universal will of the international community to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free
world.
· The willingness of all states to offer a maximum degree of transparency and readiness
to co-operate. To this end, transparency measures and the principles and criteria on
which they are based must be constantly and systematically developed. The violation
of internationally agreed standards of transparency would then be an exception and
would even represent a suspicious indication. This transparency is still inconceivable in
important elites, especially in those states in possession of nuclear weapons. On the
other hand, the movement towards a greater degree of transparency is all too obvious.
· A verification system based on two pillars: an internationally organised verification
apparatus applying negotiated processes and technologies, and the additional
possibility of incorporating further information in a flexible manner, including
information from secret services. Mechanisms to encourage the disclosure of further
information must be reinforced, above all the encouragement and protection of whistle
blowers. Many of the techniques which today still count as NTM, such as satellite
surveillance, should be internationalised if possible.
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· International mechanisms which can be used to enforce the consequences of
suspicions. This would first be further verification and clarification measures, and, in
the case of the confirmation of a suspicion, measures which would reverse the nuclear
weapons program.
It can not yet be determined with which details verification and transparency measures and
the future organisation should be formed. They stand at the end of a long development
process which has only just begun. To advance this development, on the one hand, much
individual progress is required, similar to that which is already taking place (outlined in
chapters 0 and 0). On the other hand, a fundamental rethink is necessary: none of the
individual steps should be regarded as an end in itself, but rather as part of a process
leading to more transparency and further nuclear disarmament. Even though the objective
of a nuclear weapon free world is still dominated by disunity, with some voices in favour,
some against, and some simply sceptical, new principles should be generally recognised.
These principles should be transparency and irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.192 The
fundamental rethink includes the fact that nuclear activities in nuclear weapon states are no
longer purely a national matter but that, just as in non-nuclear weapon states, the
international community has a right to transparency, which, put in concrete terms, means
the introduction of IAEA safeguards. The time is right for this, and the development is
realistic. (cf. 3 1.5  Disposal of Nuclear Materials from Disarmed Nuclear Weapons).
The FMCT will prove to be an important milestone along this path. Confidence in the fact
that verification of a nuclear weapon free world is possible will grow in line with the
progress made along this path, so that it can finally constitute a realistic option.
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Appendix A: Functioning of Nuclear Weapons





Fig. 1: components of a modern nuclear warhead ("Hydrogen bomb [H-bomb]")
                                         
193This sketch and description contain only the information which has been published to date. Technical
details cannot be taken from it. Measurements and shapes are arbitrary, and do not correspond to reality.
The mode of functioning of the detonator of the secondary (the so called "Teller-Ulam-Principle") is the
same as with inertial confinement fusion (ICF). It became known as early as the start of the 1980s
through German and other publications, and was also declassified in the USA in the early 1990s. See
e.g. Jürgen Meyer-ter-Vehn, Zur Physik des Fusionspellets, Physikalische Bätter, Bd. 43, 1987. p. 424.
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The primary, which is solely based on nuclear fission, is a warhead which functions
according to the implosion principle. A hollow sphere of HEU or plutonium , the so-called
"pit", is surrounded by a neutron reflector of, for example, beryllium. The configuration is
subcritical. The explosive lenses consist of specially shaped and specially assembled parts
made of conventional explosive material with different detonating speeds and several
igniting points. If these are ignited simultaneously (with an imprecision on the scale of a
ms), a spherically inward-directed detonating wave is generated. By this wave, a heavy
mass which is lying below is accelerated inwards. This requires precision both in terms of
space and time in order to avoid instabilities. The detonating wave compresses the reflector
and the pit so that an overcritical mass is generated. Shortly before maximum
overcriticality is reached, starting neutrons for the chain reaction must be generated by use
of a neutron generator (not included in the sketch). The time for this must be chosen in
such a way that there is maximum compression when the energy generated by nuclear
fission is just large enough to trigger an additional expansion. The chain reaction is in
addition reinforced by "boosting". That is, deuterium-tritium gas (DT) is inserted into the
hollow space of the pit just before ignition. When the temperature and the pressure exceed
specific thresholds, fusion is triggered in this gas (D + T ® a + n + 17,6 MeV) which
releases further neutrons and accelerates the build-up of the chain reaction. This means that
a greater proportion of U or P cores are split before the chain reaction stops as a result of
the expansion. With the aid of boosting, it is possible to vary the yield.
Most of the energy of the primary is first released in the form of black body radiation in the
X-ray spectrum. The primary and secondary are located in one casing. The casing and
outer shell of the secondary consist of optically dense material so that thermal equilibrium
rapidly develops between the primary, secondary and the casing before significant
mechanical effects occur. In order not to hinder this thermalisation, all the mechanical
holding material is optically thin. The outer layer of the secondary, the so-called ablator,
vaporises, creating an inward repulsion (ablation). It consists of optically dense and heavy
material. The internal part of the secondary consists of lithium 6 deuterid (Li-6D). The
ablation generates an inward shock wave which compresses the Li-6D. The closer the
compression comes to an adiabatic curve, the higher is the possible density. The ablator is
thus probably constructed in such a way that several shock waves can be generated one
after the other, so that as a whole, the adiabatic compression is approximated. 194 The DT is
located in the centre. Here, the shock waves meet and generate a hot plasma of high
entropy corresponding to the fusion conditions for DT. As a result, fusion reactions are
triggered which deposit their energy in the surrounding compressed and colder material in
the form of kinetic energy of the reaction products. This material is thereby also heated up
to fusion conditions, and in this way, a fusion wave propagates from the inside outwards.
This process is quicker than the following mechanical expansion of the plasma. In the
                                         
194The theory of spherical compression is described in: G. Guderley, Starke kugelige and zylindrische
Verdichtungsstöße in der Nähe des Kugelmittelpunktes bzw. der Zylinderachse, Luftfahrtforschung 19,
p. 302, 1942; for a short summary see K.A. Brueckner/S. Jorna, Laser-driven Fusion, Rev. of Mod.
Physics, 46, no. 2, p. 325, April 1974. Here: p. 347. See also: J. Meyer-ter-Vehn/C. Schalk, Selfsimilar
Spherical Compression Waves in Gas Dynamics, Zeitschrift für Naturforschung, 37a, 955-969 (1982).
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simplest case, the secondary and its compression are spherical. It is speculated that
cylindrical compressions can also be generated. The reaction in Li-6D is a double reaction:
¯
D + T ® a  +n + 17,6 MeV
¯
n + 6Li ® T + a +  4,8 MeV
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Appendix B: A Comparison of Enrichment Processes





















Gas diffusion: uranium hexafluoride (UF6, gaseous) is diffused through
a membrane, whereby molecules with U-235 diffuse more frequently.
The amount of lighter materials is thus slightly increased on one side.
UF6 1,0040 – 1,00452300 – 3000 matured USA high
Gas centrifuges: particles of different mass are diversely distributed in a
rapidly rotating gas centrifuge. It is thus possible to extract differently
enriched gas from different parts of the centrifuge.
UF6 1,3 – 1,3 100 – 300 matured Europe high
Jet nozzles: molecules of differing density display slightly different flow
characteristics in a specially formed nozzle. It is thus possible to channel
off parts of the gas flow leaving the nozzle which are diversely enriched.
UF6 + H2 1,05 3000 – 3500 matured South
Africa
high
Chemical enrichment: reaction rates also depend on the mass of the





1,0025 – 1,003 £ 600 test phase
Electromagnetic enrichment (calutrons): a U-ion beam is pulled through
magnetic fields in an orbit. The radius here depends on the mass.





Laser isotope enrichment (atomic): U isotopes are differently stimulated
in U vapour with the aid of lasers and then selectively ionised. The
ionised isotope can be channelled off using electromagnetic methods.





Laser isotope enrichment (molecular) UF6 + N2 5 – 15 » 10 – 50 research industrialise
d countries
very high
                                         
195Based on: Krass et al., op. cit. (fn 79), p. 188
Appendix C:  Glossary of Some Specialist Terms Used in the Verification System of
the IAEA
Significant quantity:196 the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which,
taking into account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing  a





Pua 8 kg total element
U-233 8 kg total isotope
U (U-235 ³ 20%) 25 kg U-235 contained
Indirect-use material
U (U-235 < 20%)b 75 kg U-235 contained
thorium 20 t total element
a) For Pu containing less than 80 % Pu-238.
b) Including natural and depleted uranium.
Detection time: the maximum time that may elapse between diversion and its detection by
IAEA safeguards; according to the current guidelines it should correspond in order of
magnitude to conversion time.
Conversion time: the time required to convert different forms of nuclear material to the
metallic components of a nuclear explosive device. Estimations are in the order of days for
direct-use material, weeks for chemical compounds not exposed to radiation, months for
spent fuel and one year for LEU, natural uranium and thorium.
Detection probability: the probability, if diversion of a given amount of nuclear material
has occurred, that verification activities will lead to detection. (Shortened text, further
terms and formulas are used for the quantitative definition.196)
False alarm probability: the probability, , that statistical analysis of accountancy data will
indicate an amount of nuclear material missing that is larger than expected on the basis of
measurement uncertainties when, in fact, no diversion has occurred. a is usually set at 0.05
or less.
                                         
196IAEA-Safeguards Glossary, op. cit. (fn 10).
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Abbreviations
AVLIS atomic vapour laser isotope separation
CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DoE Department of Energy
EMIS electromagnet isotopic separation
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU highly enriched uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion
INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces
kg kilogram
kWh kilowatt per hour (unit of energy)
LEU low enriched uranium
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging
ms micro seconds (10-6 s)
MOX uranium-plutonium mixed oxide
MUF material unaccounted for
MW megawatt (power unit)
NIF National Ignition Facility
NNWS non-nuclear weapon state
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTM National Technical Means
NWS nuclear weapon state
Pu plutonium
PUREX plutonium and uranium recovery by extraction
R&D Research and Development
SON State outside NPT
S3 Strengthened Safeguards System
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWU separative work units (measurement for the separative work achieved in the
course of enrichment)
t ton
U-235 uranium isotope with the mass number 235
U-238 uranium isotope with the mass number 238
UF6 uranium hexafluoride
UN United Nations
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission for the Iraq inspections
